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Pre face
Interest in incentive contracting has grown with the procurement of complex weapons and space systems - pro-
curements involving a preponderance of R&D effor i and uncertainty in the cost outcomes. Because of these cost
uncertainties, cont:acts for R&D procurements are typically negotiated with Co;t Plus Fixed Fee provi._ions. Two
objections are generally imputed to the CPFF contract: it encourages an understatement of the target cost; it is
not cot,ducive to efficient contractor performance. The incentive contract fee arrangements (the Cost Plus Incentive
Fee and the Fixed Price Inca ,tive), on the other hand, incorporate contractor participation in cost overruns or under-
runs through a vanvble f_ e schedule end, in theory, gent_rate conscious cost control efforts on the part of the con-
tractor through an appo a, to the profit motive.
The efficacy of thf incentive contract has been questioned and defen_ed at some length; to date, its proponents
seem to outnumber its detractors. Incentive contracts have generally received industry commendaticn; industry
spokesmen specific_ Ay acknowledge that these contracts contribute to efficiency. NASA has placed considerable
emphasis on subs' 4tuting incentive for CPFF contracts whenever possible. Because of the important status of this
c.3ntract form and a specific expression of NASA's interest in a study of the _objectivity of NASA's fee policy",
our in,,_odgstion to date is devoted to the incentive contract fee objectives - its capability for accomplishing the
ostensible contracting objectives, the validity of its rationale, the basis for the contractor interest in this type of
,._ntract, etc. 1
We have departed from the customary form of presentation in that a somewhat lengthy summary, conclusions and
recomm,-ndations are presented prior to the discussion proper. This arrangement is intended to accommodate those
desiring a ,,_eneral discussion of our approach, but who are disinclined to pursue a lengthy discussion incorporating
mathematical -oration.
8mnnutry
This paper is an inquiry into the rationa!e of the Cost Plus Incentive Fee and the Fixed Price Incentive con-
tract forms. Experience with the incentive contrs_:* is well documented and there is little ne_v or revealing to be
expected from further su_'_ys or data collection in this :_.1_. _enite this, we are unaware of any effort to sys-
tematically analyze this contract form in the presence of these t. _ts. (The recent papers of Frederick Scherer's
are an exception). In short, we. believe that the known experience with incentive cop.tracts should he sufficient to
determine the influence of the contract fee arrangements on the contractor's efficiency, the contractor's evaluation
of this type of contract, and the desirability of continuing with this contract form in pursuit of the ostensible ob-
jectives offered for its use.
1The direction and objectives of our research were reoriented at the beginning of this year at the request of the
Office of Policy Planning (NASA) in conformity to that office's objective of identifying and analyzing NASA's
present and emerging policy problems.
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The principal thesis of this paper is that the incentive contract form must be examined in terms of elementary
decision theory (analysis ince,-pomting the contractor's utility function and the question of choice unde: uncer-
tainty) We are convinced that this approach clarifies the contractor's decision problem and develops the P=ces-
sary insight as to the value of this contract for stimulating contractor efficiency. The development in the earlier
part of the paper is the necessary background for this thesis. 2
There are certain assumptions (both explicit and implicit) associated with incentive contracting which are use-
ful to keep in mind.
(1) A contractor acts to maximize his short-run profits.
(2) The contractor can control the cost outcome of the contract and participate ia the benefits (rewards)
arising from the additional profit associated with ir.aprovements in efficiency; i.e., the contractor will
reap rewards of efficiency and pay the penalty of inefficiency.
Experience with incentive contracts, however, clearly indicates that the cost sharing by the contractor is not
sufficient to stihmlate efficiency, and there is constant admonishment on the part of the procurement officials to
negotiate sharing fractions which are considerably greater than the present experience. (See the quotations from
the speech of Thomas Morris, page S.)
This leads us to a fundamental inconsistency in incentive contracting. The contractor's efficiency is not a fa¢.-
tor to be associated with risk; efficiency is directly and completely controllable by the contractor. (The association
of efficiency and risk can be noted in the quotation on page 5.) Therefore the contractor's choice between inefficient
procedures or profits (the choice that the fee schedule attempts to influence) is a choice which can only be made un-
der conditions of cost certainty. But the cost uncertainties associated with incentive contracting conditions are pat-
ent - uncertainties which, in most instances, exceed by a considerable magnitude the range of cost under the influ-
ence of the contractor. The final cost outcome has but very limited relationship to the contractor's efforts or capa-
bilities at cost control. Therefore, at the time of negotiation, the contractor is more concerned with establishing, a
favorable position with respect to the cost uncertainties involved in the contract than the possibility t.e rewards fo_
future efficiency. It is not logical to design an appeal to a contractor's profit motive through a cost oatcome over
which he has little control. Maximization of profit is a logical objective under conditions of cost certainty, since
the maximum utility will always occur at the point of maximum profit. However, the contractor will not necessarily
act to maximize the expected profit, since maximizing expected profit maximizes the contractor's utility only in
exceptional circumstances. This point receives cot_,Jderable elaboratiot_ in the paper.
Furthermore, the procurement manuals, contracting guides, etc. convey another implicit assumption - that the
contractor's risk is primarily a function of the sharing fraction. The contr,_ctor's participation in cost sharing is
certainly an element in the risk assumed, but risk, by any measure, is a sensitive function of the distribution of
2 We will not elaborate here on the background material and support for cur arguments which is presented in the
first part of the discussion material. We have limited the summary to our primary points and these are summar-
ized in order of their occurrence in the discussion.
ii
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the pogsible cost outco,nes and, even more particularly, of the relahon of the target ,:0,4 to the d_str_butloa of
possible cost outcomes. Incentive contract negotl,_tions attempt to maximize the ris_ to the contractor through the
ndgotiation of tight target costs while, at the same time, urging greater contractor partscipat,on m this risk through
greater sharing fractions - objectives which are mutually incompatible. The topic of -isk and the negotiation of
these contracts under these cond,tions of uncertainty is a primary concern of this paper
One must view the incentive contract negotiations as the arra'4gement of a satisfactory gambJe for the contrac-
tor. Any dec;sion problem under uncertainty is properly considered a gamble; there is a unique aspect, however,
to the arrangement of this lottery under the terms of an _acenti _ contract which makes it part_cul,rly mtere:dmg
from a decision theory point of view. To explain, first consider a contractor faced with bidding on a sealed-bid
contract and with a certain confidence that he must bid-in at Sx in order to get the contract. He has but one option
-either not to bid (not to gamble), in wl_ch case he gains or loses nothing, or to bid tbo contract, with a certain
expectation of gaining a certain profit and another expectation of losing a certain profit. The expected winn_.ngs
(expected profits) is the probability (degre,z of belief) that he will receive a positive profit times the amount of that
profit. The expected loss will be the probability of a loss times the amount of the loss if a loss occurs. The sum
of the two represents his expected monetary gain. Obviously any change in (a) the amount to be geined (or lost) or
(b) the probabilities associated with a given gain (or loss) will influence his interest in either accepting or rejecting
the gamble However, under the conditions described, the contractor has no capability of changing either the probabili-
ties associated with a cost outcome or the amount of the expectation; his choice is either accept or reject the lottery.
On the other hand, the incentive contract provides a plethora of opportunities to vary the expected gain or
loss, via (a), through the multiplicity of fee arrangements - the upper and lower fee swings, the upper and lower
shpr_ng fractions, the target fee and the target cost. [We are assuming that the probabilities (b) attached to the
uncertain cost outcomes essentially remain unchanged.] If the contract negotiations involve multiple incentives,
the opportunities to vary the expected fee increase by the multiple of the incentive goals. (See page I8) The
contractor's options may be best described as a choice from a spectrum of alternatives,with a CPFF contract fee
(which is considered by some as a riskless contract) at one end and the FFP fee a_rangement at the other.
Our primary point of :aterest centers on the negotiation of an expected fee outcome of maximum advantage to
the contractor and how this is determined. There are certain related questions:
(a) Does the incentive contract provide increased benefits to the contractor (as opposed to a CPFF contract),
and do these benefits arise through the exercise of efficiency?
(b) Does the maximum advantage accrue to the contractor w_th the maximum or minimum of cost-sha:4ng par-
ticipation, or does it occur with partial fee sharing arrangements?
The explanation of our approach begins with an illustration of a probability distribution of cost outcomes
(called a subjective density function) together with the fee function. (See page 11 an':l Figure 1). Figures 2 and 3
illustrate the sensitivity of the probable or expected loss (for particular contracting conditions) to the measure of
cost uncertainty (the standard deviation of the probability distribution of cost outcomes) and describes the "chances _
that a contractor has in achieving the theoretical limits of the fee outcome given certain contracting conditions.
iii
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This example is offered only to demonstrate what is often overlooked - that the expected fee Is considerably less
than the maximum fee swing, unless the target co.'_t is negotiated _n_enably high.
Before _nswer_ng the above questions it is ir_._'_ortanto examine the assumption that a contractor operates to
maximize his shot_:-run profits. The subject of contractor motivation has been extensively investigated by mana-
&erial economists and the.,e is significant agreerre nt that the contractor does not act to maximize short-run profits.
This background is reviewed, page 13 to 16. The empirical data on contractor behavior with incentive contracts
apparently supports this argument. If the contractor intended to maximize the expected profits he sho,,ld always
elect a maximum sharing fraction - if the target cost is negotiated greater than the expected cost outcome (as
_llustrated in Figure 4 and in the discussion on p_ge 12). Since the contractor never accepts maximum sharing,
one can only conc_.ude two things; either the target cost is typ_cafly negotiated iess than the expected cost out-
come (extremely doubtful) or the contractor is not maximizing the expected profits.
A decision is always a choice between the utdities of the alternatives present in the decision situation.
Utility is a concept long used by economists to indicate a measure or index of the satisfaction afforded by an
economic good. Since a cardinal measure of utility (an "absolute" measure, like gallons, inches, etc.) is impos-
sible to devise, the concept of utillty has generally been left to theoretical discussions. Recent developments in
this field have resurrected a measure of utility called the _Bayesion" or "Bernoullian" Ut.qity index which is
capable of being determined for an individual. While this index is not strictly a cardinal ;neasure of utility, it is
sufficient to allow the determination of an individual's choices m_der situations of uncertainty - if he follows
certain assumptions defining rational behavior. Under these assumptions, the contractor will attempt to maximize
his expected utility (the sum of the. probabilities associated with each outcome times the utility measure of each
outcome) if he behaves rationally.
The fee function is a Bernoullian Ut;Jity function only if there is a linear or proportional relationship between
the amount of the fee and the "satisfaction" which it generates. Studies of contractor motivation indicate that this
is never the case, (unless the fee outcome is comparatively inconsequential to the decision maker, which per se
eliminates it from our interest). Rather, the contractor has a decreasing marginal utility for fee (i.e. fees increase
at a decreasing rate with an increase in the fee); the change in utility for a given change in fe_ is represented by a
curve which is concave, as illustrated in Figure 5.
One can conclude without further elaboration that the contractor's maximum benefit with incentive contracts
does not lie at the FFP end of the fee spectrum. Conversely, then, is the contractor's maximum satisfaction
attained with a CPFF contract or with _rtial sharing fractions? And why? T'ds is an important question to
answer in any analysis of incentive contracts, and the general model of contractor behavior, (beginning, page 17)
provides the basis for this answer. This model assumes enly a general class of utility functions, those which are
concave, and s,:.nmetrical cost densities. It examines the changes in the contractor's expected utility with changes
in the target cost and in the sharing fraction.
This examination yields the following interesting fact. If the target cost is negotiated greater than the con-
tractor's expected cost outcome on the contract there is always a range of sharing fractions which will provide the
iv
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contractor with a greater expected utility fromthe incentive co_ract than he would receive from the cpfrF contract.
even if they are both negotiated with the same target fee. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Furthermore, there is
always one value of this sharing fraction which will pgovide the maximumexpected utility. (This is illustrated by
the dotted line, Figure 6). in other words, for every target cost greater than the expected cost, the sharing fraction
can ta;_ a large numberof values which wi|l make the gamble on the profit outcome of the incentive contract a
preferable choice to the CPFF contract.
The model of contractor behavior was developed incorporating only one o, the several negotiated contract
terms - the sharing fraction. It can readily be seen that the negotiation of the fee swings and the target fee, as
welJ as the xarget cost, will present additional opportunities for increasing the contractor's expected ,:ility; i.e.,
these additional contract arrangements all present opportunities for effectively accomplishing the sam.', end as
would be achieved by increasing the target cost itself. The succe_ of the incentive contract formfor _,chieving
greater post facto utility (increased fee) will obviously depend upon the contractor's competence in cost estimation
and negotiation. But given a schedule of probable cost outcomes (subjective cost density), the contractor has
several paths by which to negotiate a fee arrangement more favorable than that offered by a CPFF contract - or a
greater expected utility. We have aLtemptedto illustrate the sensitivity of the expected utility to the various cost
and contract parameters in Figures 7 and 8. The utility function assumed for this illustration is presented on
page 18.
Webelieve that this model of contractor behavior is both normative',and descriptive; it is not only _ model for
optimumcontractor behavior, it describes present contractor behavior and the basis for the contractor's present
satisfaction with this contract form. We believe it is s formal description of the contractor's approach to contract
negotiations; it describes how the contractor can improve his situation with an incentive contract - not through
cost efficiency efforts but through negotiations.
In a sense, the section discussing risk in incentive contracts Ceegiuning page 19) is somewhat redundant after
the discussion of contractor behavior in maximizing expected utility in incentive contracts; a contractor who oper-
atee to maximise his expected utility has properly considered risk. However, there may be some who feel that
utility moss urea of co-,tractor behavior remain somewhat esoteric for the pragmatic issues of government procure-
meritand who prefer to consider risk an either the chance of an outright loss or as a measure of the expected
amount of that loss, If s loss occum. Using these latter two definitions of risk together with measures of uncer-
tsinty interpreted fromthe contracting manuals, we have attempted to demonstrate through simple algebra that it
would be quite easy to _gotiate a CPlF contract with more risk than a FFP contract, even with f_,irlysmall shar-
ing fractions. (This development has certain elements of obviosity except for the fact that there is a very strong
inclination to forget the measure of cost uncertainty when considering risk in tee arrangements and measuring risk
strictly in terms of the sharing fraction). If the target costs are customarily negotiated close to the expected cost
outcome, it is unlikely, on this basis ai,,ne, that incentive contracts will be negotiated with greater sharing frac-
tions than are presently experienced.
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The ft_hal section of the paper (beginning on page 23) examines a "fee" function which i_ a_ c×pression of the
marginal gain or increment that a given cost-plus contract will add to the firm's gross profit. [This function is
heleaftet called the marginal fee expression and ,n the Text portion it is labelled F*(x). I ]'he net increment
o, ed by a cost-plus contract is equal to the fee only it the reimbursement for costs is actually equal to the cost
which was incurred If a!l costs were direct costs, then the net gain to the contractor would only be that normally
associated with the fee The manner of determining overhead costs, however, is such that for many contracting
situations the net gain derivable from the overhead payment is considerably greater than that normally associated
with the fee proper. This is because the reimbursement paid to a contractor for overhead is determined by multi-
plying the direct costs on the contract by a burden factor - the ratio of all overhead to all direct costs. Unless
(1) a!l of the sales are cost-plus, (2) the actual overhead on the contract is of the same proportion as that exist-
ing on the other sales in the firm and (3) the overhead varies proportionally with the direct costs, this method of
allocating overhead provides essentially payment for costs which were not incurred. For those who believe that
the contractor is motivated by the prospects of short-run profit, it is importarr to note that in many contract cost
situations and contracting fee sharing arrangements now being negotiated, the ,contractor will usually find it to
his advantage to incur overruns, rather than underr ins.
This net or marginal fee function is the logic.a1 o,,e to _e for decLsion making _,_d evaluation purposes by
both contracting parties. Although this function _'_s _ecessarily developed under spe_f_., assump_.ions, it
shouL'l still be possible to apply it to a broad,",, :_,.nge of contracting sit,rations, albeit a¢_,:.imate answers will
result. "l_e empirical evidence does not supfx rt an ascertion that contractors control _h_:; r -st outcomes to maxi-
mize the marginal fee; however, our evidence b'__ "-s that they are generally aware t_,a_ a ." :'_siderable portion of
their net "t'ee" arises from the overhead cost re;,:,_':ar_,emcnt. F_thermore, it is diflicuit _. ' ._plicitly state the
proportion of contracting situations in which the ,_.,giaal fee expression presents a s:, _ • ::t:tly different fee
outcome than the more traditional fee expression. O ..... x_-mples, although appro_,, _:;. _, . _:oactual contracting
situations, indicate that a firm v'ith 50% or possibly rnor_, _:-._'t_iu:;gale,_"_'oui_' '- _ignificant difference in
the two fee expressions.
Conclusions
1. The contractor is not greatly motivated by the prospect of a fee greater than that which he considers "fair";
i.e., he has a rapidly decreasing marginal utility for fees. Rather, contractors receive, greater motivation
from the prospects of future sales.
_.'_ The incentive contract philosophy incorporates the explicit assumption that contractors can and will signiti-
cantly control their costs to participate in the incentive "rewards" for efficiency. The possibilities for con-
trolling the cost outcomes ar_ insignificant in comparison to the cost uncertainties associated with incentive
contracts. The:afore, the c _ntractc" seeks the most desirable position ia terms of the uncertainties o_ the
cost outcome. This positic,] does not coincide wtth the negotiation of hig',. -_haring fractions and wide fee
vi
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swings - terms which would be a significant inducement to the contractor to hold costs.
3. The contract,,: :as an exceptional opportunity with incentive contracts to negotiate fee arrangements r_roviding
for a greater expected utility than that derivable from a CPFF contract; i.e., he can derive an acceptably higher
expected fee from the incentive contract than from a CPFF contract. However, this increase in utility does .Jot
arise from an increase in the contractor's efficiency, but through the opportunities associated w_th the negotia-
tion of a multiplicity of contract ar.,,ngements. Therefore the cortracto," probably has ample reason, on the
average, to prefer incentive contracts,
4. Tight target costs a:e completely incompatible with the negotiation of strong inceJ tire provisions (high sharing
fractions, etc.). Assuming that the target costs are reasonably "tight" , on the average (a factor difficult to
measure), there is a definite indication that sharing fractions larger thatJ those now being negotiated would
result in incentive contracts with greater risk than FF P contracts - unless the target fee is considerably
greater than the legal limits.
5. Furthermore, there appears to be little inducement for the government contract neg3tiators to negotiate sharing
arrangements which would provide a significant inducement for the contractors; in fact, it is usually to their
(contract officer's) advantage to arrange moderate to small sharing a--angements.
6. Incentive contracts have an advantage of flexibility in the fee arrangements, assuming that this attribute is a
rational and desirable objective. Despite certain past criticisms, the incentive contract has the quasi-theoreti-
cal facade of promoting the efficiency through a basic appeal to the profit motive. Since it is unlikely that
incentive contracts will ever be developed with zignificant sharing arrangements, there is only limited support
for argtmients that a high fee outcome is the product of efficiency, and the profit outcomes are likely to be vul-
nerable to greater criticism in the future. Another possible advantage to incentive contracts may he generated
in the inherent emphas_ on meeting the target cost; the psychological effects of such emphasis may i, revent
or mitigate large overruns. (This particular and important aspect was not investigated ie this paper). This
possible advantage, however, is indepet dent of the incentive fee arrangements.
7. The -,,ethod of pricing cost-plus contracts can result in a grater fee for overruns than for underruns. This is
a significant factor to consider if one is designing a fee schedule to appeal to a short-run profit motivation.
However, if contractors are oriented towards the short-run proiit rewards one would expect a greater number
of cost overruns on incentive contracts than are presently indicated by empirical data. Therefore, there is
reason to believe that the contractors are generally unconcerned about the marginal aspects of the fee situation,
or that they are mote concerned with the positive benefits to their long-tun sales associated with a reputation
for acl'.ieving target costs.
8. Our conclusions point to the general absence of a potential for negotiating fe_ arrangements which will stimu-
late contractor efficiency. We believe, as does Soberer, that the contractor's performance can he better con-
trolled through some organizeQ method of contractor performance evaluation or, generally, through inducements
directed at long-run rather than short-run interests of the contractor.
vsi
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F_ecomme nda_ions
1. 1.f contractor e[fic:.ency and ,.onLrol of tt',_.,contract costs are t_e plimary bas.;s for using incentive contracts,
N._A should seek other fee u=rangements than the CPiF or the FPI.
2- _;otivat_on of cont-"ac',ors should be based primarily on appeais tc their long-run rather than their short-run
interests. The Conhactor Performance Evaluo*ion Program was intended to measure contractor pe:formance
over the long-run, a,'d i{ a ccmprehensive program of this type can be developed by NASA, contractor perform-
ante evaiuation together with a CPFF fee aK:angement should be considered as a substitute for the CPIF/FPI
con[racI_
3 On the other hand. if those responsible for _.)]icy select contractor motivation as a primary objective of the fee
atrange_,:nt; ttlen other co.ntract t'o;ms shouId be emphasized. In this regard, our initial appraisal indicates
tea." the Aw.3_ Fee contract should receive more emphasis and be considered for wider application. Also the
British pre_eret_ce for =_egotieting a CPFF contract _Rh a switch to FFP as rapidly as the costs are determin-
ate is a more !ogica! contract.;ng forra for applying maximum incentive from the fee arrangement than the present
CPW or FPI fee arrarlg3ments.
VIII
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Introduction
The pricing of government contracts is an anomaly to ._conomic theory. Not only :.: t:,e iraditional market
place absent, but the buyer, to a large extent, determines tie pricing mechanism. Yet the government-consumer is
typically uneasy ever the price outcome and the jus,'ification of the fee. The contract forms and pricing procedures
associated with this singular market t,ave developed from temporizing between the urgency of procurement, the
criticism of wastage and inordinate profits, ant; the counter claim of unsatisfactory profits. The procurement
agencies persistently seek improved pricing and procurement procedures, and the last five years have seen an
increasing emphasis on the incentive contracts, weighted guideline pricing techniques, as well as procurement
innovations indirectly related to pricing, e.g., the Contractor Performance Evaluation Program.
lncenttve contr,-cts are the most prominent (from the standpoint of interest) of the present contracting arrange-
ments, and it appears to be an acceptable _ontracting arrangement to those immediate.ly concerned. Contractors,
to all appearances, prefer this contrac.ting form to the Cost Plus Fixed Fee. The government (nerticularly DOD)
claim re_markable cost savings thre,_gh the use of incentive contracts; all parties (with the possible exception of
the Renegotiation Board and the GAO) attribute the preponderance of cost underruus experienced with incentive
contracts to the efficiency induced by the incentive features of the contract arrangements. At the same Lime, the
majority of the contracts are negotiated with terms which significantly limit contractor participation in the profits
resulting from cost savings, and the cl_ims of sigr, ificant savings resulting from incentive ,:onttacts are even
more interesting in view of such limitations to the contractor's inducement. The government procurement officials
recognize the inconsistency of the usual contract arrangements and incentives, and they constantly urge the nego-
tiation of contract terms incorporating greater contractor participation in possible profits or losses (higher sharing
fractions) applica_)le over a greater range of c_st experience (wider fee swings) with target costs negotiated
closer to the e-.tpected cost outcome. In spite of this, the pattern of negotiation continues to favor low profit
sharing fractious for the contractor. This phenomena, among others, appears to offer an interesting subject for
investigation.
Our study of this contracting form was undertaken in response to a list of topics from NASA expressing inter-
est in a study which would improve the "objectivity" of its pricing procedures. Incentive contracting is an obvious
beginning point. It is Unlikely that another study of incentive contract pricing would greatly change the under-
standing of this contracting form which has been the subject of scrutiny for some years. However, examination of
this subject from the standpoint of decision theory and Bernoullian Utility concepts provides useful additional
insight as to coatractor reactions and the effectiveness of this contracting arrangement for promoting efficiency.
The incentive or inducement associated with the contract fee should also be considered in the context of its mar-
ginel content and contribution to the firm's profits, particdtarly in view of the manner of contract pricing. Con-
tractor's response to marginal fee situations h_ve previously been observed, but the critical features of this sub-
ject have never been presented. A study ot this topic forms a second portion of the paper.
i
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Contracting Forms
T.he primary types of contracting forms in use today are the Cost Pius Fixed Fee (CPFF), the Cost Plus
Incentive Fee (CPIF), the Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) and the Firm Fixed Price (FFP). Under the CPFF contract,
the contractor and the go _rnment negotiator arrive at an estimated target cost (a best estimate of _hat th': con-
tract performance will cost). A fee is then negotiated on this cost estimate, usually around 6%. The government
tb_n -aburses the contractor for any costs incurred. Under the CPIF contract, the government is also responsible
:,': all costs incurred. However the target fee is s_lbjeet to an increase or a decrease d__pending on the extent to
which costs underrun or overrun the target cost. The rate of increase or decrease in the fee as a [unction of cost
is called the "sharing factor _ or =sharing fra_.donn: the range between the upper and lower limits of the fee is
called the =fee swing". In other words, the negotiated fee will vary up to an agreed upon limitation in cost varia-
tion about the target cost. The FPI ,:,c_ntive contact is the same as the CPIF contract except that a ceiling
price is negotiated: i.e.. there is a negotiated price above which the government will not reimburse the contractor
for coals incurred on the contract. The FFP contract is a fairly self explanatory title - the contract is negotiated
for a firm price c.il overruns or underruas are absorbea by the contractor. I The differences and similarities of
the contracting forms can be determined more explicitly by examining them in notation. This notation will be used
throughout the paper. Let
z = contractor's sharing fraction [0 _ k < 1.0]
Xo = target cost
xI = cost associated with maximum value of fee swing
x2 = cost associated with minimum value of fee swing
p = upper price limit (FPI only)
f = target fee = AXo [where 0 < Ag 1.0]
x = final cost outcome
CPFF contract:
F(x)=f+k(xo-x)=AXo 0gx£_, k--0
CPIF contract:
F(x)=f+k(xc-xl) for0<x<xl, 0_k_1.0
= f+ k(xo- x) forXl_<x <_x2, 0< k_-1.0
= f+ k(xo- x2) forx2 -"x _._., 0":k_ 1.0
FPI contract:
F(x):f+k(xo-x) for0 .x,. P " f'kx° 0-. k-. 1.0l-k '
-- f - (Xo- x) for p" f'kx¢ . x_1-k
1The above distinctions in the contracting forms are gross ones. There are other differen:..-s: e.g. under CPIF
contracts costs are established by NPR, while under FPI they are negotiated at contract termination. These
other differences are not considered pertinent to this discussion.
2
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FFP Contract:
F(x)= f_ (Xo-X) for0,.x_.
The Rationale for Other Than CPFF Contracts
It is the basic tenet of incentive contracting that the contractor is motivated principally (if not entirely) in
terms of the profit outcome; i.e., if the contractor is giver, the oFportunity of increasiug his expected fee outcome,
his actions will be consistent with maximizing this outc.Jme. A profit maximizing objective will necessarily in-
volve the elimination of =unnecessary" costs. Since the government pays all incurred costs it benefits through
this saving and can therefore =afford" to pay additional fees to encourage this performance.
There is an additional conviction that the CPFF contract, per se, is a basic factor leading to excesses and
wastage in contract performance. This i3 an obvious corollary to the motivational assumption just stated.
Horror cases ot lagging program schedules, perlormance tailu:es, massive overruns
in cost, and so forth were widely publicized... [11, p. 2]
. . . fixed fee arrangements tend too strongly to create an environment in which
cost and time are irrationally subordinated to insigniticance . . . the contractor
has little or no moasmahle stake in the outcome, since in the CPFI ¢ contract,
his lee remains static. [11, p. 7]
Widesprend uae of the CPFF contract is therefore, considered a major cause of
the unsatistactory results ot many large development projects. [11, p• 7]
One can find many similar statements in the speeches of various responsible government officials•
The contract form, however, is by no means the sole explanation for cost overruns, lagging schedules, etc.
Such contracting'innovations as the Program Definition Phase of DOD, etc. implicitly recognize this fact. In
places the contracting manuals recognize this fact also:
But in another sense, recourse to this contract torm is itselt regarded as a symptom
of a deeper problem. Behind the tendency to "go CPI:F" lie the more basic de-
tects of insufficient planning and identical treatment ot all research and develop-
ment work. The end objective, then, of a revitalized approach to research and
development procurement is not just the elimination of a contract type, hut the
correction of these fundamental deficiencies.
It is obvious that the same balance between cost, time and performance that char-
acterizes DOD's program decisions must also be a motivating tactor in the behavior
of Oovernment contractor._. This motivation will be supplied by tying profits to
contract results. [11, p. 7]
Unfortunately, this symptomatic view of the CPFF contract is not consistently carried through in di._cusaion
of the role of this contract. Since the CPFF contract form is often considered a primary causal factor of p,. ;: _on-
tract performance, the following gene_•alization is also encountered frequently:
• . . if the Defense Department achieves its goal of $3.2 billion r_.duction in CPFF
contracts in fiscal 1963, as compared with fiscal 1961 . . . it would avoid about
8320 million in overruns. 2
2Testimony of Thomas E. M _ls (ASDIL) before House Military Operations Subcommittee. Aviation Week, 3 June
1963, p. 85.
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• . . We are convinced that this (the CPFF contracting form) is a major contributing
factor to the high costs of weapons today. [21, p. 171
Tne base; for such ccnclusions have been difficult to determine, but they apparently arise from gross comparisons
of the cost outcomes of incentive and CPFF contracts. There is a definite underrun bias in the cost outcomes of
incentive contracts while the opposite is true with CPFF contracts - ergo a cost savings from the former contract
type. 3 Since the CPFF centracts are let for uncertain research endeavors with, often, grossly specified objectives
(quite contrary to the conditions specified for incentive contracts) it is difficult to accept that the CPFF contract
form is the causal tactor of overruns or that the implied savings will result from some other contract type.
F_xperience with Incentive Contracting Provisions
If the c_tractor acts to maximize the expected fee outcome, and the negotiated cost is equal to or greater
than the contractor's expected cost outcome, there is no apparent rationale for the selection of a partial sharing
arrangement, or limited fee swings. 4 Present and past experience with CPIF contracts indicates t_mt the contrac-
tor is reluctant to accept large sharing fractions or fee swings. 5 This experience is a prima facie refutation of
the hypothesis that entrepreneurs have the singular motivation of maxim_ing expected profits. There is an obviouv
observation that the contractor may prefer to take a small gamble rather than a large one, but this is inconsistent
with the hypothesis of fee (or expected fee) maximization. The contracting manuals explicitly urge the negotia-
tion of contract provisions with greater contractor part':cipation in the profit outcome. Again this counsel is
repeated in speeChes by government officials.
3 There are numerous and rather fragmentary collections of data comparing the two types of contracts on cost out-
comes. A bette_ one is given by Dr. Fred Moore [19, p. 42 and 48] who, it must he added, does not draw these
conclusions (p.49). By his data it is calculated that CPFF contracts have overruns about 55% of the time while
CPIF contracts have cost underruas about 75% of the time. Case history data examined by Harvard Weapons
Acquisition Research Project found a s_ilar frequency of undermns. [22, p. 224] also [23]. Data submitted to
the McClellan Committee hearings also substantiate these findings. [26, p. 674 and 818]. The Air Force presen-
tatiun (p. 818) indicates that even when the total dollar value of incentive contracts (totaling more than $4 billion)
is evaluated thelre is an underrua of 3.4%. Th,_:r comparison of total cost experience on CPFF contracts with
that of incentiv_ cuntrscta finds that the former run i0.6% greater than the latter. This apparently matches the
estimate used by DOD in calculating "savings" attribut, ble to switching from CPFF to incentive contracts.
As of Dec. 31, 1964, only six incentive contracts had been completed for NASA for a total of $2.8 million.
(This does n_t include award fee contracts.) This experience represents about a 4% overrun, but it is insuffi-
cient for determining separate NASA experience on CPIF contracts.
The Contractor Performance Evaluation Program appears to be the only potential source of accurate informa-
tion as to the causal factors for the cost experience. This program, practically speaking, is just underway; it is
a primary endeavor to measure contractor performance. Such an evaluation demands some insight as to the factors
mlderlying contract performanc'_, and cost outcome. Despite the difficulties and ambiguities of such evaluations,
an examination of the data generated by this program may establish the responsibility of the contract form to the
cost outcome.
4 See p. 12.
5Moore [19] shows data on 130 CPIF contracts which indicate that 59% of them had sharing arrangements of 20% or
less, while 96% had 25% sharing or less. Personal investigation of this experience with DOD contracting per-
sonnel indicates this experience i._ still fairly general. "In fixed price incentives we seem to be wedded to an
$0/20 or 75/25 sharing." See speech by T.D. Morris (ASDIL) [21, p. 551. Our examination of contracting ar-
rangements on the CPIF contracts negotiated by NASA indicates similar outcomes. (Also see p. 12.)
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! am not satisfied with these (sharing) percentages for two reasons. First, they do
not give the contractor a big enough incentive to go all out to reduce costs -. ! am
not sure that an extra St or $2 million on a $10C million contract is sufficient to
itgtuce sustained superior performance. My second objective is that they do not
impose sufficient penalties for poor performance. In his endeavors in non-govern-
mental business a contractor must be prepared to accept out-of-pocket losses for
substandard performance - but he also has full opportunity to achieve higher re-
wards for superior performance .... we should be willing to accept, and i_,pose,
far greater risks than we now do . . . such spreads in the ranges of allowable fees
and profits impose greater responsibilities and greater risks, but they also offer
the promise of greater rewards for superior perfol_rJance and suitable penalties for
substandard pertormance. [21, p. 56]
This quotation illustrates the general attitude that the cost sharing fractions typically negotiated on incentive col=-
tracts do not provide sufficient incentives. It also illustrates the general belief that these sharing fractions can be
considerably increased aed that the contractor should be willing to accept greater sharing fractions since he must
be prepared for this experience in non-governmental work. The basic error in this logic, as will be discussed later,
is the implicit assumption that risk is solely determined by the size of tSe sharing fraction. This quote further
describes a rather curious inconsistency in view of the known uncertainties of the cost situation - that the con-
tractor has a significant control _ver the fee outcome and, second, that the fee outcome is associated with risk.
• . . any substantial progress we make in t_is area will require risks -risks
(that the contractor must accept) that the contract could result in little or no fee
if his performance is poor. [21, p. 54]
A contractor's efficiency is not a matter of uncertainty or a phenomenon associated with risk; its level is at the
option of the co_tractor. Risks, on the o'_herhand, are associated with the cost uncertainties which any contrac-
toe, efficient or otherwise, cannot accurately predict. The fee outcome, however, is a product of both the con_rac-
toe's actions and'the cost umcertainties; the latter, under R&D and advanced systems procurement, probably
exceeds the range of cost outcomes subject to the control of the contractor by a considerable multiple. In view of
the extreme cost uncertainties associated with incentive contracts it is patently obvious that the contractor will
not likely welcome large participations in cost outcomes over which he has little control - assuming that the tap
get cost is tightly negotiated.
The Oenersl Problem of l_stsblishing Tsrget Costs
The cost outcome of a contract, therefore, is a function of both deterministic and random variables. The con-
tractor has a limited amount of control over the cost outcome through his own actions, while at the same time the
vagaries associated with any cont.racting operation will affect cost outcome in an unknown manner. Both elements
sre recognized in the contracting manuals.
[ln[ortunately, no amount of preplanning or conscientious negotiation can deter-
mine exactly ,'hat tile cost outcome of a project will be . . . The target cost is,
in fact, _n estimate, a prediction of future events. As such it will inevitably
contain some degree el uncertainty either large or small - some probability that
z_tcontract completion costs will be, for example, 10, 15, or 20 percent above or
below target. Each procurement, then, is concerned not wilh _ single cost, but
S
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with ,, band of possible cost outcomes. The narrower this band, the more risk of
pertormance being shifted to the contractor by means ol firm tixed price or incen-
tive contracts. (The negotiator) must formulate ,in estimate ol the amount by
lrhich [inal costs might devb_te fro_ target. [20, p. 203]
• . . when the upper limit (o[ the expected cost outcome) is less than _I0% the
government should concentrate on negotiation ot a firm fixed price arrangement.
For an upper limit between 10% and 25%, the fixed price incentive type will usu-
ally be appropriate. When confidence decreases to a level of more than 25%, a
CPIF. Thereatter, the CPIF arrangement is appropriate, at least theoretically,
regardless ot the deterioration of the confidence level. [20, p. 2011
On the other hand, the philosophy of incentive contracting supposes that the contractor is in control of the
cost outcomes.
Profit and tee is thus tuned to the contractor's control ot a variable on which his matmgement
skills can have a notice,hie eltect. [20, p. 103]
At r/hat level should an incentive target cost be set?.., the target cost should
represent the best mutually determined estimate of what costs will actually be.
when the work is complete. The target cost should be set that the contractor, it
he perto,"m_ with more than usual etficiency, has a real chance to do the work tot
less than tattler . . . these are the same criteria as used tor the CPFF or FFP
contracts. In other wtmts, ditterences .in risk inherent in various contract types
should be retlecte(" not in the cost estimation process but in the establishment
of profit (or fee) rates. [20, p. 202]
For obvious reasops contractor capabilities for predictinE cost outcomes are difficult to evaluate objectively.
Somegeneral perspective of this matter is important to the evaluation of the contractor's decision process since
the average errors ic cost estimates could dominate any margin of control that the contractor may have over costs.
Since this capability for prediction would vary so greatly by contractor and contract the matter can only be exam-
ined in generalities.
Marshall and Meckling [18] have presented data for a number of missile and aircraft models comparing the in-
creases in the cumulative costs of production with the cost estimates. Their investigation involved the preparation
of adjusted ratios of the cumulative average cost of production of the mentioned items for comparison to the earliest
of such cost estimates as were available. As might he anticipated, the data leave much to be desired as to accur-
acy and lack of ambiguity, [18, footnote 9, p. 468] and two sets of ratios were determined for each program because
of the equivocality of the price level adjustments. Using one set of facto=s (ratios subject to a given set of adjust-
ments), two of four cargo anti tanker aircraft programs experienced cost outcomes equal to the estimated costs,
while the other two had 40% and 50% overruns. Using the second set of adjustments for the same programs, the
results were measured as an 80% and 90% underrun and a 50_ and 60% overrun. The other groups (fighters,
bombers, missiles) indicatet_, much greater variations. It was the authors' conclusion that =The factors (the
adjusted ratios) for (4 different) cargo and tanker aircraft (programs) probably represent an upper bound on the
currently attainable level of accuracy in cost estimating. _ [18, p. 471] (The conclusion would obviously pertain
to this type of procurement)•
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Alchian [3] recently reported a study of the prognostic reliability of progress (or l_arning) curves bvsed upon
data recently declassified; he w_s interested in the accuracy to which direct labor costs could be predicted from
knbwledge of past experience with the production of similar aircraft types. Progress or learning curves were de-
veloped from certain post war inquirie_ of RAND personnel who found a "log-log" relationship between the direct
labor per pound of airframe and the nth airframe. Since direct labor is the important component in the building of
airframe, a prediction of the labor hours involved would be an importa- _ element to estimating the contract cost.
It might be noted, that the aircraft examined in this particular study were composed of traditional or propeller
driven types. It is unlikely that, even for the period under consideration, the development of these aircraft pushed
the state-of-art - at least in the same sense as many of the aerospace systems under development today. While
the theory of learning curves is not profound or involved, it remains one of the important methods for pzedicting
costs. Therefore the reliability of this procedure provides some understanding of the importance of the known ver-
sus the unknown factors in cost outcomes - again for systems not generally suitable for FFP contracts.
Nevartheless, for practical purposes it may be appropriate to use an average of
individual progress functions. One such practical pro-pose would be the prediction
of total direct labor requirements/or the first 1000 airplanes el a particular model.
The average error of prediction is shown to be about 25 percent. For the entire
output of any particular airframe model produced in one facility the error of pre-
diction is also 25 percent. [3, p. 679]
If specific carves are fitted to the past performance of a particul_r manufacturing
facility in o¢_r to predict its [mare requirements, the margins of error or predic-
tion average about 20 percent. All these margins of error, while averaging about
20 to 25 percent, represent specific errors which in .9 of the cases range between
-40 a_id +70 percent. [3, p. 679]
These s,adles of cost estimates on unsophisticated airframes (by today's standards) suggest that cost predic-
tion for aerospace systems would appeal to the mole adventurous. It also suggests that the uncertainties of the
cost ot_tcomes should be the most prominent factors in the contractor's decision process.
The SubJeot of Uaneoel;sary Costs
CPIF contracts are negotiated wRh the explicR viewpoint that savings are made by the elimination of "unneces-
sary" expenses - the discharge of unnecessary personnel, the elmination of overbuilding (go_dplating), etc.
"Wastage', "unnecessary costs" are ambiguous terms, and the contractor and contracting agency have different
bases/or such evaluations. Past experience with contractor operations, especially during the early fifties, might
support the contention there is always considerable wastage in large systems contracts. But it does not neces-
sarily follow that the elimination of cost items, prima facie excessive or unnecessary to a contract, are accom-
plished at no cost to the contractor. For example, an excess of personnel on a contract may illustrate the
contractor's efforts to maintain the continuity of the organization. This is an objective which occupies a place of
primacy among managerial problems, and it is not often realized by the firing of scarce technical personnel. An
excess of personnel may also denote the development of a new capability for the contractor. Furthermore, the
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rigid enforcement of cost controls necessary and expected in an organization oriented to civdian goods production
are difficult to apply to firms commited to .sales involving a preponderance of R & D. These observations are not
m,lde in defense of costs considered items of waste from the contracting officer's point of view. They are to ob-
serve what contracting manuals ignore - cost reduction demands effort in any circumstan_.e, 6 arid perhaps mote so
in R & D types of contracts. A dollar reduction in cost does not produce an additional profit equal to the sharing
factor times the reduction in the accounting cost; in fact it might require a rather sizeable sharing frectioli to
"break even".
As noted later (with the discussion of contracto: motivation) the contractor is seldom in a position to select
an alternative which wil! maximize profit outcome. A firm will tend to operate at a level at which, by some devised
crit.:tla, the managers are (or are not) satisfied. (This is usually referred to in the literature as "satisfycing"'.)
There is cgnsiderable evidence that certain CPIF contracting situatians have rP_ulted in shock situations to the
contractor, and an incipient failure to obtain a certain fee (one of the firm's goals) has resulted in cost rt-.duction
actions. On occasions the threats of a potential loss have resulted in the exercise of particular care not to exceed
the established cost goals which may or may not be efficient or austere ones. However, unless the contractors ate
in a potential or actual loss situation it appears that little will goad them into an efticiency drive, or any change
in the status quo of cost control activities. But it is important to note that the contractor is highly unlikely to
enter into the contract or conduct his neKotiations with the attitude that he will later improve his efficiency. Few
firms upon introspection would admit to material inefficiency, particularly following a period of financial adversity.
Cost reduction here could only be achieved at high opportunity costs. The contractor will, therefore, base his
judgments at contract negotiations upon hi_ evaluation of the cost outcome under his present state of operations. 7
6This pointisexplicitlymade by Scherer,[22],[23].Scherer'smodelconsidersonlythecontractor'sdecision
makingas a decisionbetweenthediscountedfutureprofitswhich would c_.,sultfromany givencostreductionpro-
kramsand theincentivefeewhich _,ouldresultfromthatcostreduction.The contractorwould thenconducthis
actionssoas tooperateata levelof"efficiencyn tomaximizethedifferencebetweenthefeeassociatedwitha
negotiatedincentivecontractminus theuserca,'ts(ordiscountedfutureprofits).Scherer'sfirstpresentationof
thismodel[23]didnotconsiderthecostoutcome as a randomvariable_His secondpresentation[22]differs
fromthefirstonlyinthatforthecostoutcome(X)theexpressionE(X)was substitutedinallequations;i.e._the
contractoractedto_optimize_ inhisdecisionmodelon theexpectedcostoutcome. Inthislatterinstance
Scheretrecognizesthatthecostoutcomeis uncertain- butthattheseuncertainti'_do notchangethedecision
processofthemanager. A decisionmodelofthiskindcouldonlyfindempiricalapplicationincircumstancesin
whichthe"limits"ofthecontractor'ssubjectivedensityofcostoutcomeswere smallincomparisontothe range
overwhich thecontractorcouldcontroltheoutput;i.e.,costuncertaintiesaterelativelyunimportant.
7Our interviewsand discussionswithcontractingpersonneloftenvettedtothesubjectofwastage incontracts;
contractor'scostcontrolefforts,etc. Individualswho were experiencedwithcontractivg,costoutcomes,etc.
had wide17differen'opinionsas tothecontractor'scapabilitytocontrolthecostoutcomes.
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Incentive Contracti:_g as Gambling
A gamble, in its bar.st essentials, consist_ of choosing between two alternatives - opting a give" sum of
tunney with'certainty (meaning, usually, not playing) or an uncertain outcome consisting of either a larger sum or
loss, each associated wi_.h a given probability. More elaborate gambling situations involve more than a dichotomy
of outcomes each associated with a given probability, but the essentials remain the same.
There is a reason for this patent definition of a gamble, Many decision problems made under uncertainty are
described by such a lottery; a decision to accept an incentive contract with a variable fee can be viewed as accept-
ing either the chance of a fee larger or smaller than that connected with a CPFF contract, or the CPFF fee for
certain. 8 It is true tha_ the contraclor does not have the same freedom of choosing between the CPFF or t.e in-
centive contract form as might be associated with a choice in a casino; however, the selection of the contract
form i._ a matter of negotiation as well as being dictated by the cost uncertainties, what is dist.ioctive with an in-
centive contract is the multiplicity of fee arrangement_ which, in effect, further determine the contract type; i e.,
the contractor has the petenual through the sharing fr-actions, fee swir,gs, etc. to approach a CPFF fee arrangement
as one limiting form and the FFP fee arrangement, which offers the maximum chance for gain or loss, as the other.
As will be discussed later, a choice between gambling or no_.gambling can be determined by changing either;
(_) the probabilities associated With the uncertain outcomes, (b) the values of thes" ",certain outcomes :_rboth.
The incentive contract provides the potential for the latter. The negotiation of the incentive contrac_ should
therefore be viewed as the negotiation o¢ an acceptable lottery to the contractor.
A proper analysis of CPIF contractL.g should incorporate principles applicable to deci,_ion making under un-
certainty. There have been various attempts to apply game theoretical analysis to the problem of contracting, 9
but it appear,,; more reasonable to consider the problem as one of decision theory instead of game theory. (The
distinction here follows Baumol in that decisien theory is game theory where the opponent is not a ratzon_ _ individ-
nal. This is som_imes described as "games against nature n, i.e. the factors which condition the outcome are, in
general, inexplicabl ;.) Furthermore, in a typical contracting situation it does not seem reasonable to consider the
contractor and ;he contracting agency as opponents seeking _ntithetical goals, although castml impressions of
negotiation proceedings may appear to the contrary. The long-run goals of the two parties are :',_: same - that of
producing a quality product and maintaining the financial health of the firm. Both parties in most instances are
8It is often said that a CPFF contract is a a_iskless" contract. This is not a sound generalization. Large over-
7 as on contracts _,re often associated with difficult problems which the contractor encountered in the exe vise of
the contract. Although his fee is not altered under the terms of the CPFF contract, overruns usually mean that
he is employing expensive technical personnel for no reward, unless the contrdctor has no alternative use for
these personnel at the time. This uncompensated overtime constitutes a real opportunity cost. Although the fee
is cotx_tant, the margin m_y not he. However, :a_ses of this kir,d do not generate the same levels of cone 'n,
s_nce opportuni'y costs are seldom reassured under accepted accountit:g principles. (This point is well stated by
Scherer [23, p. 185].) On the other hand the methods of pricing contracts and allocating overhead costs may pro-
duce situations in which there is n considerable net g,_in a_sociated with overruns on contracts. (This is covered
later in the paper.) _Riskless j CPFF contracts depend upon the contractor's cost circumstances and the ratio
of CPFF to FFP sales as well as the possible alternative uses of the _irm's resources.
9 Our information is limited to two such efforts - unpublished and pro_.rietary information,
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genuinely concerned with tl,e negotiation of -a reasonable fee, despite certain differences on its proper measure.
The contractor ae,d agency are likewise constrained to a fee outcome which is defensive under congressional com-
mit_,-e criticism, etc.
t)n the o_her hand, there are two different points of view as to how, or by what route, the contracto.- will
achieve the given fee outcome. The contracting agency attempts to bargain the contractor to a target cost from
which these additiot,al profits would be achieved only through increased efforts at cost control or where losses
would accrue if there is indifference to efficiency. The contractor conside,-s the uncertainties of the cost outcome
as the primary basis for this decision making (i.e., decision making at the t_m_ of negotiation). Rewards from
undershooting the target cost are desirable, but 1hey are to be secured in the probable outcome of the contract
under status quo levels of efficiency; the contractor does not mentally revise his expected methods of operation
with each increment of possible fee. 10 (A particularly good statement of this philosop'._y was made by General
_avis to the ,_icCieiian Committee. tz_,'^"p. 8611)
It is only after the contract has developed and l-he cost outcome becomes defir.ite that the contractor will
react to possible i,centives for holding costs. At this time the contractor's problem is one of evaluating the al-
ternatives under a condition of certainty, whereas at the time of the contract negotiation his problem is one of
evaluation of alternatives under conditions of uncertainty. These are widely different decision problems, involv-
ing different criteria for evaluation on the F_attof the ccntractot. (The criteria upon which contL:tor de.:isions
are based are d.;scussed througho,it the subsequent sections). As a result, the contract arrangements of most in.
tere_t to the contractor under certainty are of the least interest to him under conditions of uncertainty.
The Target Cost and the Expected Cost Outoome
The negotiation of the target cost is the first step in the contract price negotiations. The responsible con-
tractor must obv;onsly develop some best estimate of the cost outcome with his bid proposal, although this esti-
nmte is not necessarily that introduced into the negotiations. He will also have an estin,ate or judgment of the
upper and lower cost limits associated with the contract. And it would seem quite reasonable to expect that the
final cost outcome experienced at the end of the contract is "more. likely" to occur in the vicinity of the best
•timate than at some extreme. It is reasonable, therefore, to represent the uncertain cost situation with a sub-
jective density function given en assumption as to the form of that function and knowledge of a few of the con-
tractor's cost estimates together with their associated gross uncertainties. The exis:ence of subjective probabili-
10A target cost negotiated at the best estimate of the cost outcome implies a cost based upon efficient operation.
Therefore in an ideally negotiated contract the slack upon which the contractor can draw for increased profits
shoulu be non-existent. This would indicate a major incon._istency between the stated objectives of CPIF
contracting (rewarding the contractor for efficiency) and the goals of t_ negotiations (an accurate target cost).
On the other hand there is considerable evidence that the government is not as interested in attempting to vary
the contractor's !evels of efficiency as it is to mitigate the embellishment of the engineering product beyond
that necessary for the fulfillment of the contract requirements.
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ties associated with the estimates of the target costs are explicitly recognized by the NASA contractil,g manual
[20, p. 201] (quoted in this paper, page 6). The discussion hereafter will be oeveloped as if these subjective
densities are formally determined by the decision makers. All evidence indicate-_ that the subjective density of
!
cost outcomes :.s an important element in the decision process of both the contractor and the contractinT_ agency,
and the methodological incorporation of this function is a necessary element in the _nalysis of contract negotia-
tions - especially incentive contracting. Hereafter the word "Frobability" denotes the contractor's degree of
belief in the cost outcome; i.e., subjechve probability.
Since the cost outcome is uncertain, an assumption of profit maximization as a factor in contractor motzvation
implies maximization of the cxgected fee outcome, E[F(x)L where
X 1 X oc
E[F(x)]= f n(x)g(Xl)dx + ?n (x)g(x)dx + f n(x)g(x2)dx (i)
-'_ x 1 x2
Figure 1 is a diagram of a subjective cost density In(x) ] st, perimposed on a CPIF fee function iX(x) ]. This dia-
gram is drawn with the target cost negotiated at the contractor's expected cost outcome (here normalized at 100).
For convenience of illustration the density function was assumed to be normal In(H, o) = n(100, 20)], the sharing
factor on the CPIF contract was set at .20, and the fee swing was set at the target cost + $2S (i.e., the fee would
vary over a cost range from 75 to 12S). Therefore the contractor's fee could range from a maximum of 13% to a
minimum of 3%, if the target fee corresponding to these sharing arrangements is taken as (typically) equal to 8%.
Figure 2 shows the expected fee outcome as a function of the level _t which the target cost was negotiated
for various arbitrarily selected parameters. Obviously, if the target cost is negotiated at the same value as the
lsected cost outcome, the contractor cannot expect (average) more than the target cost. The expected fee would
theoretically nevdr reach the contractural upper limit of 13% and the target cost would have to be considerably
above the expected cost outcome f ,r this expected fee to even reach 12%. Similarly, the larger the value of o,
the greater the spread between xo and/_ associ(_ted with a g,ven expected fee outcome. 11 An increase in the
sharing factor (k) and the fee swing would increase the expected fee outcome for all values of Xo> tz. A contrac-
tor optimizing the expected fee outcome would obviously elect the m_ ,mum sharing factors and fee swings, as
well as attempting to negotiate the target as far above the expected cost outcome as possible.
The function plotted in Figure 2 prima facie suggests tha_ the uncertainty (a) ab_ociated with the cost out-
come of the contract would be of little importance to the individual contractor. The marginal difference in
E[F(x)] for the two assumed values of o was, at best 2% under the assumed conditions. By way of providing
perspective, Figure 3 indicates the probability of obtaining a fee less than 6% (the typical target fee for a CPFF
contract) for various values of xo. For a sharing factor of .1, a fee swing of _+ $2S and o =-25, the contractor
1lOne may wish zochange theassumptionofa feeswi._govera constantcostrange(L$25 intheabove example)
toone where thefeeswing rangesovera constantpercentageofthetargetcost. Inthiscase theE[F(x)]
would increasemonotonicallytoexceedthecol)tracturallimitof 13% _nd would be higherforallvaluesof
xo _/_thanthe previousfunction.
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would anticipate better than a 20% chance of getting less than 6% if the target cost is negotiate¢1 at hi,.: expected cost
outcome. When o = .1, this probability is considerably lower. An increase in the sharing factor flora .1 to .2
would increase this probability (of a fee iess than 6%) to approximately 35%(if o : 25). This is still sig: Ificantly
high even when the target cost is negotiated 20% above the expected cost outcome. By the same _oken, a large
uncertainty attached to the subjective density of outcomes should increase the probability (the contractor's belief
in his receipt) of a large fee outcome (say one larger than IfYTo). These observations suggest that a measare of
risk (uncertainty of cost outcome) is an important factor in CPIF contracting.12
It is important to observe that the contractor's behavior, if he is maximizing ElF(x)], is entirely dependent
upon the sign of (xo - #) and is i_deF_ndent of o. For a fee function g(x) _ymmetrical about the target cost, and
xo :/z, the expected fee is equal to the target fee (which for purposes of this explanation is assumed fixed). Or
ElF(x)] = f for xo - #
This expected cost outcome would be unrelated to the sharing fraction negotiated; i.e., E[F(x) ] = f, for
0 _ k <__1.0. A target cost negotiated at (x o - #) > 0 would result in E[F(x) ] > f for 0 .: k _<1.0 and would be maxi-
mized at k = 1.0. If, on the other hand, (xo - #) < 0 then E[F(x)] < f, for k > 0.13 Therefore. if the contractor
acted to maximize the expected value Gf the profit, one would expect the contracting arrangements to polarize at
either a FFP or a CPFF contract. (For a contractor maximizing the expected fee outcome, the optimum value of
k as a function of the negotiated target cost is given in Fig. 4). This behavior is patently absent from empirical
data of contracting ,legotiations. Customarily the contractor negotiates for low sharing fractions; i.e., contracts
are seldom negotiat_ for sharing fractions exceedilig .30. These fractions are accompanied by fee swings which
also limit the expected cost outcome. Since experience indicates that underruns are more frequent than overruns
there is clear indlcation that the target cost is negotiated above the expected cost outcome. Therefore, if profit
maximization is the contractor's objective, the evidence is substantial that contractors are not attempting to
maximize fee outcome, and a model of contractor behavior should seek other explanations.
Utility in Gambling
The association of utility with gambling behavior has been formally recognized since the 17th century. The
recent resurgence of Bernoullian utility theory has developed from a desire to explain preference between uncer-
tain choices. Choices made under conditions of uncertainty are made in response to the utility (or subjective
12This ,'pint is discussed here at this length because of the lack of reference in the contracting manuals to cost
uncertainty when imputing f_e to the risk function (See NPR, Section 3.8L_. For a further discussion of risk
measure as a probable loss of fee see pp. 19-22)
-t3This behavior is independent of the fee swings if these are negotiated symmetrical about x_. However, ElF(x)]
would be maximized by unlimited fee swings at (xo - #) > 0 and by _ero fee swings for (x o - #) < 0. Since the
sharing fraction and the fee swing are two methods for achieving the same ends, the latter parameter is
omitted from the analysis for simplicity.
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evaluation_ of the presented alternatives; under the Bernoullian utility axioms however, decisions between uncer-
tain alternatives are made in response to the expected utility of the outcomes. The proliferation of papers
dqveloping the concept of the Bayes principle is sufficient argument for its use here, and the rationale of th_s
decision rule will not be argued. Much of the literature on applied decision theory develops the subject in term_
of the less amhiguous measure of the expected monetary outcome of the alternatives, while recognizing that utility
is the sole criteria governing the choice of alternatives. Schlaiffer presents a "test for the validity of expected
monetary values as a guide to action":
To sum up: business men tend to treat acts which must have one or the other of
just two possible consequences as being "really _/orth" their expected monetary
value as long as the worst of the two consequences is not too bad and the best of
the consequences is not too good. [24, p. 28]
• . . we will realize that whethe¢ or not they (busine,_smen) formally compute mone-
tary value they act in accordance with expected monetary vatue when ll_ amounts
at stake are not too large. [24, p. 29]
Generalizing on Scldaiffer's test, the expected monetary outcome is a guide whenever the monetary outcome
is not very important to the decision maker, in which case the utility of the outcomes will also be a linear func-
tion of the fee. If this situation is generally true, fire individual fee outcomes do not warrant particular attention
or study, and neither could they he considered as a source for contractor motivation. The first point of interest
is the nature_of this utility function for the contractor; the second is to generalize from this function to certain
conclusions concerning incentive contracti_,g.
l_umgvrlgl Mot/v_tlon and Profits
A principle assumption of traditional micro-economic texts has been the goal of profit maximization. This
assumption has traditional origins in earlier economic writings which were primarily concerned with the rational
behavior of the owner-entrepreneur. In addition, there are pedogogical advantages to th;s assumption, since it is
necessary for a precise analysis of normative behavior. There are several instances in which economists have
14 The prominence of the profit maximizationsupported this assumption for no other mason than this convenience.
14Stigler takes the contrary position to that of this paper and states that...'profit maximization is the strongest,
the most universal, and the most persistent of the forces governing entrepreneurial behavior" [25, p. 149]
•.. "The profit maximizing assumption confers great definiteness on economics. The variables in a firm's policy
that affect profits are usually more or less quantifiable, and the rule of maximum profits is simple; equate mar-
ginal cost to price." [25, p. 150]
On the other hand, it should not be implied that theoretical economists have been exclusively preoccupied
with the principle of profit maximization. Chamberlin has distinguished between almporfect Competition" (Mrs.
Robinson) and his theories of "Monopolistic Compe:ition". The former theory, exclusively preoccupied with
marginal analysis, is closely identified with the profit mr_imizing principle. Chamberlin points out, somewhat
impatiently, that his theories are completely compatible with full cost pricing and other forms of entrepreneurial.
behavior not compatible wRh the principle of profit maximization. [9] But for that matter, marginal analysis
is not an exclusive technique with pr-qt maximizers; e.g., even the Russian planners use it. [4, p. 129]
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assumptionintheteachingo{economic principleshas undoubtedlyledto itsincorporationas a principleof incen-
tivecontracting
The incentive principle holds, in b-ief, that a contractor should be motivated, in
calculable monetary terms . . . [11, p. 101]
The unqualified use of this assumption in college texts may be a disservice to the general student, for there
is little evidence that profit maximization is at all descriptive of nehavior in other than very limited situations. A
vast amount of recent literature in economics, sociology, and psychology is devoted to the topic of the large cor-
poration as the primary entity in the economic-social organization, its organizational objectives and the goals of
its otofessional managers. This literature expresses a common belief that the professional manager or e_:ecutive
is differently motivated than those individuals assuming the entrepreneurial functions - the stockholders or the
entrepreneurial manager. It is not su.,prising to find that the professional managers pursue diverse and frequently
conflicting objectives rather than the unique aim of maximizing profits. One authoritative early study of managerial
motivations does not even mention profits as an activating influence. 15
Another thesis common to students of managerial behavior is labelled "satisfycing _ [10], [6]. This term de-
scribes decision making in circumstances precluding the determination of optimal objectives. The d_cision maker
must select a lesser goal by some predetermined criteria - one which is satisfactory or "good enough m. For exam-
ple, profit maximization is attained at the point at which marginal c_st equals marginal revenue. As yet there is
no evidence of a business man v,ho has satisfactorily determined this point. Instead, it is universal business be-
havior to establish a price and output by some other criteria, and the fi_.:_i relationship to the maximum profit point
is unknown and, at times, incidental.
These other criteria are usually aggregative indices - turnover, aggregative profits and, particularly, total
v
sales. One thesis holds that the accounting budget is a primary determinant of organizational objectives. [10]
The budget, by its very nature, becomes a prediction and schedule of performance, as weil as a criterisn for ade-
quate and acceptable performance. The budget specifies relationships between sales and costs which become
guideposts to the achievement of a satisfactory, but not a maximum level of profits. But more important the budget
prescribes the year-to-year standards of be,_avior.
It defines the decisions of one year and thereby establishes a prima [acie case for
continuing existing expenditures. Only in quite exceptional ca_es do firms in fact
reexamine the rationale of existing functions, for example, or alter, radically the
expenditures for thorn, This tends to be particularly true of overhead functions
• .. [10,p.51]
The evidenceand accumulationofexperiencehas ledotherstudentstoassertthatprofitsatenotthe prime
objectiveofthelargemodernbusinessenterprise.To Baumol,[8][6]businessmanagershave a dominantdesire
tomaximizethefirm'salesand willconstantlypursuethisend subjectto profitsas a minimum constraint;i.e.,
(althoughitissomewhat ofan over-generalization),profitsarea necessarynuisance.16 A recenttreatiseby
15aThemost importantspurstoactionby thebusinessman ate.., theurgeforpower,thedesireforprestige,
grouployalty,security...m [14,p.137]
16Thisisparticularlytrueinshort-runsituations.See [8,p.1085]
14
"19660"14828-028
Marris (based somewhat more strongly 1_ponthe psychological studies of manageria] behavior) is consonant with
Baumol's conclusions at_d asserts that the mar,ager will attempt to maximize the growth rate of the firm, subject to
t_ constraint of security (security from corporate raiding). Furthermore, the manager's rate of advance is deter-
mined exclusively by his peers and superiors (not by stockholders).
"... it is more likely to be governed by criteria derived/rom the collective situa-
tion ot the managerial class which . . . means tavouring expansion.., a man is
tmlikely to be judged by his ability as a profit maximizer." [17, p. 102]
We may conclude from this that contractors do not approach the contract negotiation with particular attention
to fee outcome, particularly to maximizing it. They come with notions of an acceptable fee for the contract (a
level they wish greatly to e.ttain but not necessarily exceed) and a preoccupation for increasing or holding the
sales level, hut more important, this evidence strongly suggests that the average contractor has a rapidly decreas-
ing marginal utility function for fees. Instead of maximizing fees this person operates towards acceptable or con-
strained minimal profit objectives. He will find little additional utility in exceeding this profit objective - it will
not be a matter leading to professional eclat nor to an increase ._nsalary, perhaps the contrary. On the other hand,
the manager will find considerable disutility in any profit outcome which falls short of some minimal or acceptable
goal.
If the professional executive or manager is not motivated by the anticipation of high profits it would be even
more difficult to project such motivation to the typical project manager. This individual is usually highly trained
and competent in a particular skill, as well as having managerial abi,lity - an individual whose professional appro-
bation is more likely to arise from an-association with a competent engineering accomplishment than through a
measurement of success related to profit return. On the other hand, a monetary 1-oss associated with a project is
q
likely to be an indictment or symptom of technical failure. It is doubtful if the motivatioss of project managers -
individuals most likely to be responsible for performance outcome on the contract (cost outcomes included) - would
include profit maximization.
To our knowledge, Scherer was the first to clearly point out that dcfense firms have a decreasing marginal
utility for profits. [23, p. 243]. His case histories indicated that contractors strive to improve efficiency when
confronted with a loss but are indifferent to a rewani for such efforts. (This phenomenon was unequivocally verified
in our discussions with procurement personnel.) This empirical evidence, plus the failure of his model to explain
observed phenomena, led $cherer to suggest the need of a "pressure theory" for contracting as opposed to a "reward
Lheory=, and a more general theory of contracting which includes _risk aversion" as a contractor goal [22, p. 276].
Perhaps there are two factors to explain Scherer's proposal for additional developments in a theory of contractor
motivation. First, ha incorporates utility into his analyses through the expedient of indifference curves, but in-
_fference curve analysis is not useful to the explanation of behavior under conditions of uncertainty. Second,
Scherer's indifference curves relate expected profits to the probability of outright loss. That is, his utility curves
ignore t_le expected loss or the size of the loss, if a loss occurs. This is a fundamental omission of decision-
hearing information from the problem.
As previously demonstrated, tile strict profit maximization model, (i.e., contractor decisions based on expected
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fee outcomeS, does not .yield a realistic renresent_tinn,..... of contractor behavior (this _,,_,-_,s_,,,,,"_:..... ;^" ""_',_,o,_,,..,_,,:_... tl......l-,_
sented on pages 11 and 12 of this text). We feel that a decision model based on a Bernouillian utility function for
profits or fees would give a more accurate representation of contractor behavior. The observed actions of managers
with regard to the fee outcome of a contract (or profits in general) can be completely supported by the theory that
these individuals have a decreasing marginal utility for :.:ofits and will act to maximize their expected utility.
Most of the previously mentioned contractor goals e.g., risk aversion, satisfycing, attainment of "acceptable"
levels of profits, etc., are easily contained in the notion that contractors have decreasing marginal utility fo:
profits and act to maximize their expected utility. The problem now is one of examining incentive rontracting in
a utility context - specifically within the framework of Bernoullian utility theory.
Utility Theory as Decision Theory
Utility theory can best be incorporated into the explanation of contractor behavior through the concept of
Bernoullian Utility Theory, rather than indifference curve analysis, or concepts of ordinal utility. A Bernoullian
Utility Function (following Adams, [I, p. 169]) can be defined as follows: If x rs a possible positive monetary
outcome associated with an uncertain even and • s a possible negative outcome, then these alternatives can be
represented by an ordered-pair vector < px, (I - p)y >, where p is the probability associated with outcome x.
There are two assumptions defining a Bernoullian Utility Function
• . . there exists a function u with domain K (where K i_ t/_,e set of all alternatives)
such that for all x and y in K, x is preIerred or indifferent to y if and only if
U(X)__u(y)
and for all 0 _ p <_1,
u(<px, (1-p) y>) = pu(x) + O.-p) u(y)
This is to say that the utility associated with two outcomes of an uncertaiK event (where outcome x is preferred
to outcome y) is equal to the expected utility associated with each outcome. The decision theory utilizing this
utility function would incorporate the Bayes solution. 17 The outcome x, in our problem, can be a positive fee out-
come, or it could be a fee greater than 6%, or some other selected value. The outcome y could be any other fee
outcome so long as y<x. The possible fee outcomes on a contract should be considered as a continuous function
over a given range rather than a dichotomy of outcomes, and the probabilities associuted with this would be a con-
tinuous density function.
A utility function therefore can be substituted for the fee function g(x) in (1). The fee function is obviously
well determined for a given contract situation; a measure of the utility function associated with this fee function
is another matter. It is well recognized that utility cannot be measured in a cardinal manner such that the utility
17"The'intuitive idea of the Bayes principle is that in forming his preferences among the acts, the individual
must act as though he forms estimates of the probabilities of the states in $ and that his preferences are in
accordance with the expected utilities derived from these probabilities." [1, p.233]
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values can be added. On the other hand, it is possible under the Bernoullian utility definition to measure utility
up to a linear transformation. A contractor acting in a manner consistent with the axioms associated with Ber-
noullian utility will act to maximize his expected utility, i.e., this utility concep_ can be used to explain contrac-
behavior when confronted with choices under uncertainty. A utility measure is a psychological index and its
measurement is difficult sad c:ten inconsistent for this reason. Being psychological the utility measure is
individualistic, and the measure of a "firm's" utility for fees may not be uniquely determined by a simple experi-
ment. But an awareness of the capability of measuring utility uniquely up to a linear transformation is valuable
if onl:, to avoid analyses based uoon a vacuous concept. In ',he usual event the responsible individual in the
firm is no more aware of its utility function for the fee outcome than he is for his own utility function for money
outcome - but he will act in accordance with some unconscious recourse to such a function.
A General Contractor Decision Model
The fee function is again written
F(x;k) = f + k (x 0- x) for:' 0_<x_ o_
O_k_ 1.0
With little loss in generality assume that f = 0 and define a Bemoullian Utility function,
U[F(x;k)| = U[k(x 0 - x)] for: a_<x<b
(The fee swing is again considered unlimited for purposes of simplicity). Zero on the Bernoullian Utility Scale is
U[F(x0; k) ] = F(x0; k) = 0
Assume that U[k(_ 0- x)] is strictly concave; i.e., the function is continuous and
d2U IF(x;k)]
<0
.ix2
Assume, also,a rectangularsubjectivedensityof.:ostoutcomes
h(x) = 1/(b-a) a < x _ b
Figure S shows this density, h(x), together with the fee and utility functions fo_ k = I; i.e., F(x; I) and U[F(x; I)].
Where x0 = b, the fee and the utility will be maximized for k = 1.0 since the partial expectation of a loss equals
zero. If x0 approaches p, the partial expectation of a negative fee incre-_ses and when x0 = p, the expected fee
will equal zero. However, the expected utility, because of the nature of the defined function, will become zero
atp<x 0 = c < b.
Decreasingthe valueofk from1.0to0 forany valueofx0 willrotatethefeefunction45°toan expectedoat-
come of zero. The utilityfunctionwillrotateand changeshape withdecreasingvaluesof k;when k =0, utility
iszeroforallvaluesofx. By definition,atx0 = c theexpectedutilitywillbe zerofork = 1.0and alsofork : 0.
The utilityfunctionreachesa mRximum forsome valueof0 <.k <.1.0at xo = c.18 Thereforeforeveryx0 > p there
18A mathbmaticalproofisgivenintheAppendix.
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is some value of k > 0 which will maximize the expected utility at some positive value. These maximums for spe-
cific values of xo are illustrated by the dotted durve in Figure 6 19
, An increase in f (the target fee) has tbe effect of shifting the fee funct._on (and the utility function) upward
and, in turn, U[F(x; 1)] = 0 for x _ c. Thus increasing f has the obvious effect of increasing the expected utility.
It is also apparent that the fee swing car, be used to control the partial expectations of a loss and a gain. Thus
the negotiation of incentive contract terms presents a multiplicity of arrangements for effectively increasing the
contractor's expected utility. There is no guarantee that the bargainhlg will necessarily result in this increase.
But if the bargaining is not heavily weighted in favor of the government, it is difficult to believe that bargaining
over five different contract fee terms (x o, k, x 1, x2 and 0,20 all with the potential of increasing the expected fee
and the expected utility, would not usually result in an increased utility over that presented by a CPFF contract.
Contracts with multiple incentives obviously increase the complexity of the contract negotiations. Consider
a contract with incentive provisions for p_rformance and for cost. At the time of negotiation _oth outcomes are un-
known and uncertain and are described by a joint density f(Xa, Xb_. If U[F(x a, xb_ ] is the utility function, then
E [u] = _ _ U[F(x a, Xb)] f(Xa, Xb) dxadx b (2)RR
The contractor must now negotiate the target costs and target performance, the multiple sharing fractions, etc.
such that E[u] > 0, where zero is the utility of the CPFF (fee). The facility and confidence with which the
contractor can arrange terms which insure this subjective outcome is a moot point, especially as the complexity
of the arrangements multiply. Nevertheless the increasing multiplicity of fee arrangements increases the oppor-
tunity of negotiating an expected utility greater than zero.
It might be us,eful to illustrate this general model with an example. For purposes of convenience assume a
nornml subjective density of cost outcomes, and a utility function for profits which is concave. No brief is made
that the following selected utility function is representative or "average D for all contractors; however, it is a
strictly concave function as assumed in the model.
fee utiles
18 1.3
12 1.0
6 0.0
0 -3.0
-6 -9.3
The continuous utility function based on these weights or utiles can be described by a tbi_l degree function
U(F) = .0010F 3 - .0458F 2 + .7389F - 3 for-6< F_ 18
since F = g(x) = f + k(xo - x) the expected utility is
E{U[g(x)]t= _ U[_.(x)]f(x)dx forf+kxo "18 <x<_ f+kx,+6k
19We wish to repeat for sake of emphasis that Figure 4 illustrates contractor behavior when maximizing expected
fee, while Figure 6 pertains to contractor behavior while maximizing expected utility.
20This would increase to six terms, if different values of k are negotiated for overruns and for underruns.
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Figure 7 shows the expected utility outcome as a function of ':,e negotiated target cost (Xo), for selected
values ofk. In this examplep= 100, a=20, f=8and xI =x o-25and x2 =x o _ 25. For those situations in
which the target cost is negotiated less than 125% of the expected cost outcome (over the values considered) there
is a noticeable decrease in utility with an increase in k. As the target cost is negotiated at higher values, (say
upward of 125% of expected cost) there is no material increase in the utility with increases in k. On the other
hand, only contracting situations with low values of k bare positive utility (produce a utility greater than that
associated with a CPFI _ contract) when the target cost is negotiated in the vicinity of the expected cost outcome,
aud a large value of k produces an extremely high disutility in such situations.
There seems little to be gained through the analysis of a wide spectrum of possible contract arrangements.
The example just examined is one which demon._trates the bigh disutility of a large sharing arrangement if the tar-
get cost is negotivted close to the expected cost outcome. Since high sharing fractions and tight target costs arc
the primary negotiation objectives of the government, an additional example is provided in Figure 8 - one provid-
ing an extreme or upper boundary to our assumed set of parameters. In this case the sharing frat ;on was selected
as 1.0; and in keeping with this selection the target fee was assumed as 12, instead of 8. The utility function
was again determined as a function of xo for two values of uncertainty (a : 20 and o = 40). The lower value of the
standard de_-iation probably represents a level of uncertainty, acco_ing to the contracting manuals, at which one
would negotiate a different type of contract (FPI), and it is probably one in which the government contracting
negotiators would argue for the largest ._harmg fraction on the part of the contractor (commensurate with the large
target fee). The contractor's reaction to these large sharing ar.-angements when the uncertainty reaches levels
for which CPIF contracts are supposedly written (a = 40) would be readily apparent from the examination of the
appropriate function in Figure 3.
The assumption of a normal density also deserves some comment. A more logical density function for these
analyses would be. one which is skewed right, since an argument is easily made that large overruns are more likely
to occur than large underrtms. The introduction of other densities would only complicate the interpretations with
additional parameter assumptions, as well as the problem of distinguishing the correct measure of central tendency
to associate with the contractor's aexpected cost outcome" - a problem we have not encountered with symmetrical
distributions. And a normal function is a very reasonable approximation for many skewed densities. Extreme righ_
skewness however, would only increase both the probability for a given overrun and the contractor's propensity for
electing small sharing fractions.
Risk, the Shedrtng Fr&otion, randthe Tmget Fee
It is acknowledged that the FFP contract is the meat Urisky" of all contract forms and consequently should
have the g_atest monetary reward in the way of target fee. The government's ef¢orts to negotiate l_rger sharing
fractions (to negotiate the incentive co-ntrect terns closer to those of the fixed price contract) have been noted. It
may be informative to compare the FFP contract with a FPI contract, as they are typically negotiated today, on
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some measure of rink.
One measure,of risk is the probability of the contractor obtaining a negative fee outcome. A secnnd measure
of risk would be the expected dollar loss associated with the contract. Thus if n(x) is the density associated with
the cost outcome, g(x) is the fee function and x1 is the particular cost outcome at which the fee is zer,_, then risk
by the first measure is
R1 = i n(x) dx
x1
While risk measuredby criteria two is
R2 = f n(x)g(x)dx
x1
A third measure of risk might be stated in terms of a utility measure, and the utility function u(x) couid
replace g(x) in R2 with proper adjustment of the limits. However, a discussion in terms of the utility o_ the
expected loss would be more complicated and *.hepoint to be illustrated does not depend upon this improvement.
Furthermore, it w_s previously stated that the (total) expected utility of the fee outcome is the basis upon which
the contractor makes his decisions, not the partial expoctations. This assertion is not being contradicted here.
Since the imputation of fees to risk is prevalent in contract negotiations a discussion in terms of the partial ex-
pectatious of the cost outcome seems relevant.
The FPI contract form (rather than the CPIF) was selected for this comparison to the FFP since the two have
identical fee functions beyond the maximum price level of the FPI contract. This selection and the following
assumptions are for convenience of exposition; we do not feel they provide a "special case" for the general con-
clusions to be drawn. Assume: (1) that the "uncertainty" associated with a cost density function is measured by
the standard deviation, (2) the expected cost outcomes for the two contracts are equal, (3) the subjective cost den-
sities are both normal (4) the target costs for both contracts are negotiated at the expected cost outcomes, (5) the
FPI contract has a negotiated mm:imumprice at a cost equivalent to a fee of zero. Under these assumpti % the
two contracts would have the sarae risk if their respective fee equations equalled zero at the same t-value.
If
t=x-#
(7
then
F = 0 = fl * kl (Xo" alt" !') = f2 + k2 (Xo" a2t"/z) (3)
where the subscripts 1 and 2 pe=tain to the FFP and FPI contracts respectively. If these two contracts are ne-
gotiated, as assumed, at xo -- 100 =/_, then
k2 = _ (4)(72
One can al,_o examine (3) to determine the relationships of the fi given k1 = k2 = k. Thus
f2 =fl ""k:(_t - (72) (s)
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It should be also noted that negotiating Lne target cost of the contracts at a value greater tha,n the expected cost
outcome will tend to decrease the value of the sharing fraction necew_ary to equate the risl¢ of the FPI and the
FEP contracts. Assmae the two contracts being comp:.red were ,v.,gotla'od at some target cost, both greater than
their respective expected cost outcomes. If
fl =f2 =f
t I =t2=t
xo - t¢ = d
from equation/,3)
k2 = d - alt (6)
kI d - a2t
Since alt < a2t, then the addition of a constant to both the numerator and the denominator will reduce the ratio.
Assume initially that the contracts are both FFP and fl = f2 = 14, o1 = 10 and a2 = 25. (These values of sig-
ma correspond to the upper levels of uncertainty suggested in the contracting manuals quoted on page 5). In other
words, the two contracts have equal expected costs but the_e is a greater uncertainty attached to _ae second con-
tract. In order for the two contracts to have the same risk under definition (3), the second contract would have to
be let with a target fee of 35.
Since a fee of this size is clearly beyond regulations, it is reasonable to attempt to reduce the risk by using
a sharing fraction less than 1.0. The value of k which would produce the same risk on the contract _auld be .40
(er, .n 4). This is to say, a FPI contract and a FFP contract with specified uncertainty levels commensmate
with the contracting guide, both with target costs negotiated at expected cost outcome and identical t_rget fees,
could not have a sharing fraction negotiated greater than 60/40 without the FPI contract having a greater risk than
the FFP contract. Eecause the FPI contract is assumed to be less r;sky than the FFP .-ntract, the target fee m
usually reduced in accordance with this expectation. Therefore, ii a lesser target fee is associated with the FP!
contract, the value of the contractor's sh-ring factor would have to be _e._s thaa .40 in order for the two contracts
to have the same measure of risk.
Consider again the two contract forms having density functions with the same parameters es specified above.
However, in this case specify that the target cost for both contract situations w_,s negotiated at 110; i.e., the t_:r-
get cost was 10% higher in both cases than the expected cost outcome. In the case of the FFP contract, with an
assumed standard deviation of 10, the probability of a negative fee becomes quite s,m!'. However, this 10% in-
crease in the target cost over the exl;ected cost outcome does not operate to proportionally ,'educe the risk en the
FPI contract. (See equation 6). In order for the FPI contract to have the same risk as the FFP contract unde_
these conditions, the sharing fraction would have to be reduced to k = .27. And this assumes that the target fee
for the FPI contract was _t the premium risk level of the FFP contract - unlikely with a sharing fraction this low.
If the target fee is correspondingly reduced with the decrease in the sharing fraction, the FPI contract with a
sharing fraction of .27 implies a greater risk than the FFP contract. In other words, although both contracts
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become less risky with (x0 - /_) >0, the risk factor for the fixed price contract decreases more rapidly than for a
FP! contract unless the sharing fraction is negotiated quite low.
The discussion so far has bee- limited to R1 as a measure of risk. Under the assumptions, the same values
for k and f which equate the risk on the two contracts under assumption R1 will do so for R2. One can also gen-
eralize somewhat more by assuming unlimited fee swings. Because of the symmetry of the normal distribution, if
the target cost is negotiated at the expected cost outcome, the adjustments in the sharil_g fraction (or in the target
fee) which will equate the risk of a negative fee between the two types of contract forms will also equate the risk
both as measured by tho expected monetary loss or in terms of the expected utility. Whenever xo -'V, the adjustment
in the sharing fraction to equa'? the two utilities _s greater than the ratio of the two standard de':iations but becomes
a more complex function than equation (4). However, for a given value of x0, the k-value equating risk between the
contracts would be lower if the risk is measured by R2 rather than R1.
The contracting manuals meastae risk as some uncertain function of the sh_ring fraction only; as demonstrated
here the parameters of the subjective cost densities and the target costs are also fundamentally ,nvolved. The
previous examples indicate that it -'_ doubtful if the sharing arrangements could be negotiated much above their
present level without making the incentive contracts more risky than the FFP.
Motivgtion of the Contracting Officer
The discussion in this paper has considered only the contractor's behavior model. To a limited extent this
includes an implicit assumption that the government's posRion is antithetical to the, contractor's which, as
asserted previously, is not the case; i.e., the contracting officer and the contractor have similar goals.
As discussed in the preceding section, large contractor participation in the cost outco_,e would have to be
associated with a comparati_,eiy higb target cost. This would be accompanied by a high pr,_hability of underruns
with the res,.flting criticism of the profit outcome from groups unsympathetic to the view that large underruns Are
the re_suit of efficiency. [See 26, Part 2]. Contracting officem, as voted, cheracteristically demand small sharing
fractions when aware of such situations. Eut assume that the negotiations have produced a tight target cost. Even
in this circumstance there is no particular motivation for the contracting officer to negotiate large sharing fractions
and fee swings. If he is concerned about the defensibility of the profit outcome, there still remains a significant
probability of underruns and large sharing fractions are not to his advantage. O,_ the other hand, the contracting
officer (and the government) has nothivg to gain from sharing-terms which have a high probability of putting the
contractor in a tight cost situation. While there is ample evidence that the contractor becomes more cost con-
scious in such situations, the cost control efforts are likely to produce completely inconsequential results when
confronted _vith cost uncertainties of the magnitude associated with iocentive contracts. The net result is to pre-
cipitate profit situations in which the contractor is, at best, uninterested in further contract participation, except
to the extent that he considers his future sales and reputation involved. Also, the recent pronouncements of NASA
officials indicate a primary concern over final costs which considerably exceed their target costs (the opposite of
22
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the c,iticism of the McC!ellan Committee in the Boeing case). '_'_,.:_factor, per se, =bould induce the negetiating
team to shade the target cost to the high side with tile corresponding protection of low, or certa_'_ly moderate, shar-
ing fractions and fee swings.
The Question of Overhea_l and Fee Debarmtnatioa
There is a limited awareness that cost-plus pricing and the methods of allocating overhead cost can produce a
fee outcome in a manner contrary to the objectives of incentive coctracting. An article in Awation Week 21 de-
scribes a situation inx'olving a contractor with a CPIF contract and other sales of a firm-fixed-price category. By
deliberately incurring large overruns this contractor could increase his profits although this action resulted in a
minimum fee allowable under the CPIF contract arrangements. This situation is a consequence of the method of
costing contracts. Under cost-plus contracts the contractor is reimbursed for the incurred variable costs together
with an overhead loading. This overhead rate is determined prior to ",he signing of the contract. If the contractor
succeeds in ;increasing his direct costs on the contract at a more rapid rate than the fixed charges, he will, in
actuality, receive a payment for overhead charges w,"fich were not incurred. The costing procedure, in effect,
shifts a portion of the company's overhead to the CPIF contract. This "unearned" over.head payment, as in the
excmple, could be greater than the reduction in profit which would occur from the overrth'ls and the penalty arrange-
ments negotiated with the contract. It is true that the costs (variable and overhead) on a cost-plus contract are
determined at the termination of the contract, and the extent to which the firm accrues a net incremental benefit
through the overhead payment depends partially upon the ratio of cost-plus to firm-fixed sales.
This situation is not unknown to NASA. The Incentive Contrac_ht_ Guide contains an example quite similar
to that presented in the article in Aviation Week. In NASA's example the firm had negotiated a CPIF contract
with a 95/5 sharing arrangement and experienced a net gain in profits from deliberate overruns. The example also
demonstrates that the negotiation of an 80/20 sharing arrangement would have decreased the profits to be gained
from an overrun and the maximum profit would have been obtained from an undertun.
What is critically important for NA._A negotiators is not precision in estimsting
these fixed expenses, but sti.ong efforts to incorporate the steepest possible share
lines in those situations where the contribution to fixed overhead is likely to be
an -mportant factor; namely, when the contractor is operatin_ at less than full
capacity (or will be at full capacity but have no backlog) and a significant part
of his business is performed under firm fixed price contract_. [20, p. 134]
These examples are the product of a classical problem that has faced economist; and business decision
makers since the beginning of the industrial _evolution. Overhead costs are difficult to allocate to services per-
formed, and the problem becomes most onerous in industries in which overhead costs are a dominant factor, tail-
roads being the most widely cited example. Small increments of variable cost (such as adding another passenge0
are seldom associated with corresponding increases in the overhead or fixed costs, and allocations of such over-
head costs are basically arbitrary.
21Bruce Backe. "How Fees May Undermine Incentive Goal _, Aviation Week, January 11, 1965. p. 69.
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The full implicc.tions of reimbursing overhead costs to incentive contracts are generally overlooked. The
opportunity to increase the net rever_ue through overhead reimbursement is not a sit ,uation associated with con-
trhctor duplicity or. circumstances involving excess capacity. This situation is present in every cost-plus con-
tract negotiation, although both parties to the contract may be unaware of its existence. Except for those circum-
stances in which the contract overhead varies proportionally with the variable costs (a contradition, by definition)
and the ratio of overhead to variable costs is identical to that on the fixed price sales, the burde, factor repre-
sents a variable fee schedule which is a positive function of the variahle cost. Incentive contracts, therefore
incorporate two variable fee arrangements, both functions of the cost outcome but with opposite sign. The fee
increments which arise from this costing procedure can operate as "reverse incentive" to the extent that a con-
tractor is motivated by profit considerations.
Marginal Coating and the Fee Formula
The limited recognition of this phenomena is ascribable to the costing methods; the overhead cost allocation
is essentially an average cost• Incentive contracting, on the other band, was designed to appeal to an overt profit
interest in a marginal situation - the marginal gain or loss in fee associated with an ir.cremental change in the
cost outcome. Therefore the proper cost values to measure this gain or loss are associated with marginal, not
average, costing procedures. Optimal decision making implies marginal analysis.
This is the heart" of marginal decision making - the statement that an action
merits performance if and only if, as a result, the actor can expect to be better
off than he was before. [7, p. 20]
• . . the bes,',inte.est of a firm, a consumer, or any other economic unit requires
that any decision take into accotmt the magnitude of the marginal yield which
it promises. [7, p. 21]
As Baumol points out, this may appear to be an obvious principle, but it is frequently ignored. It is not always
obviol_s what the marginal yield of a given action will he, and the data available to the decision maker are often
inadequate for this determir, ation.
In business operations one often encota_ters rule of thumb calculations . . . when
the_se business calculations are explicit, they are frequently made in terms of
average rather than marginal quantities . . . yet it is tempting to reason on the
b_si_ ol unit (average) costs ot revenues or protits, largely because ot the diffi-
culty of marginal dc:a collection• [7, p. 32]
The significance of the following examination as a descriptive model of contractor behavior is dependent upon
the assumption that contractors base their decisions on marginal cost analyses. We have no information as to the
extent to which contractors consider the marginal cost in their contract negotiations; this would be the subject of
a very imeresting study, although a difficult one from the standpoint of obtaining access to accurate _ata. How-
ever, there should be no fundamental quarre! that incorporation of marginal analyses would provide a considerably
more accurate basis for norm'_tive behavior. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated later, the magnitude of the "fee"
:eturn from the overhead reimbursement is considerably greater, in many cost situations, than that from the fee
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proper. Therefore the contractor's decision process is much less dependent upon accurate marginal cost deter-
•._inations, and rather gross estimates of the marginal costs are adequate for the decision process. This factor
mitigates a prime difficulty in using marginal costing in the determination of optimum actions in incentive contract-
i
ing.
Our objectives here are:
(1) to define a moze accurate gross profit function to incorporate in a model of normative contract'_r behavior
and,
(2) to describe the fee ohtcome in terms of the various cost parameters and the sharing fraction. The latter
parameter should receive par_:icular emphasis in view of the interest in reversing the incentive to overrun through
the negotiation c-f larger sharing fractions (See [20, p. 134] quoted in this paper on page 23).
The basic fee formula remains
F(X) = f+k(X o- X)
where f is the target fee; k, the sharing factor; Xo, lhe target cost and X, the final cost outcome. In addition,
define
xo = target variabl_ cost = 100 (i.e. variable cost is normalized at 100)
x = final variable cost outcome
02 = overhead associated with firm-fixed price sales
c1 = direct cost associated with firm-fixed price sales
/3o = the overhead loading factor for target cost
_1 = overhead lc_ding factor as determin_l post facto or at end of contract
A02 = additior_l increment in overhead necessary for the fulfillment of the contract
y = target _'ee ra_e (0_y< 1.0)
k = contractor's incentive sharing fraction (0_ l, <_1.0)
xl -- dire_-t cost associated with maximum value of the fee swing
x2 = direct cost associated with minimum value of the fee swing
_8o = 02 * Ac2
cI + xo
/31 = 02 + Ac2
Cl+X
Xo = xo + ,8oXo
X = x + JSlX
The target cost is determined by fizst estimating the variable costs to be incurred in the fulfillment of the
contract. The loading factor (or burden) is the ratio of the total estima.ed overhead to the direct labor costs of
the firm (or the accounting unit) for the period of the contract. The bu;den is multiplied by the direct labor costs
25
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to obtain the compensation for the overhead.22 This method of allocating overhead assumes that the overhead cost
is a positive linear function of the variable cost and that the average dollar overhead cost ,perdollar variable cost
is a proper measure of this factor of proportionality fcr all contracts.
The foliowing analysis assumes: (1) there is no ambiguity in the determination of the variable costs and that
unallowable or unsubmitted costs are excluded, altnough these may be quite important in practice. (2) The firm=s
other sales are of a firm-fixed pric,- category and the other business operations of the company do not change to
matexially affect the existing ratio of fixed to variable costs, (c2/cl). (3) Prio; to the contract the increment of
overhead associated with that contract is properly estimated and that any overrun associated with the contract will
be made primarily in the variable cost portion. This defines a situation similar to that described in the previously
cited references (see footnote 21, and [20]). Also, to provide a better perspective, a second function will incorpor-
ate the antithesis cf assumption (3) and _ssume that the overhead increases proportionally to changes in the vari-
able cost - the implicit assumption of incentive contracting. The true situation will be somewhere between these
two extremes, but in most instances, probably muchcloser to the first.
The =fee" equation (incorporating assumption (3)) is now written to represent the net gain to be made on the
contract. The following discussion is limited to the CPIF contract, but the fee equations apply to all cost-plus
contracts with suitable selection of the parameters.
Net Gain = F*(X) = Sales - Cost of Goods Sold
= fee + reimbursement for cost - cost of goods sold
F*(x) =_yCxo +/goXo) + k;_,o(1 +/_o)" x(1 +/91)]}+ [(x +/31x) - (x + Ac2)] for Xl<_X<X 2 (7a)
= y(xo +/9oXo)+ k[xo (1+/3o)-Xl(l+/_i.1)]+ [(x+ _1x)-(x+ Ac2)] for0 <x<_xI (To)
= y(x o +/3oX o) + k[xo (1 + 8o) " x2(1 +/91.2)] + [(x + _1 x) - (x + Ac2)] for x2<x_=o (7c)
where
/91.1=c2 +Ac2
cI + xI
22Therearemany methods forestimatingloadingorburden;e.g.,directlaborhoursmay be used insteadofdirect
laborcosts.Furthermore,therearea varietyofoverheadpoolstobe distributed,r._tone. So faras thedetails
ofan actualnegotiationareconcerned,theabove isa simplifiedrepresentation.However theconsiderationof
overheadas one termrepresentingthesummationofperhapsnumerous overheadpootsdistributedina likeman-
nerdoes not invalidatethemodel forthepurposesofthisdiscussion.
As a practicalmatter,theoverheadassociatedwiththecontractislikelytoconsiytofvari_'ble,semi-vs,,-
ableand fixedburdenoroverhead.The classificationfmany costitemsas "overhead"or =v_.'_'.-'e"isa prod-
uctoftheindividualaccountingsystem. There arecertaincostitems(e.g,,electricpower)wh,c;,ms =,_,rterally
consideredvariablecosts,butwhich areconvenienttocostas overheaditems.Some costaccou.*=,_Csystems,
on theotherhand,requirextensivetimerecordsofpersonnelnormallyco,midered='overhead"(eventoymana-
gers)and allocatetheirtimetocontractsas actuallyexpended. An accuratedeterminationofmarginalil,c=e-
mentsofcostimpliesa sufficientlydetailedcostingsystem,but therewillneverbe one which willcompletely
! resolvetheambiguitiesofoverheadcosting.
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c2 +Ac 2
 1.2 --
c1 + x2
A CPIF contract becomes a CPFF contract whenever the cost outco le exceeds the fee swing; therefore equations
(Tb) and (7c) are expressions for a CPFF fee over the defined range. For a FPI contract the fee expression is the
same as for a CPIF contract except the upper limit of the range of definition would be finite. From (7b) and (7c) it
is apparent that any in,ease in the variable cost will increase t,he fee over the range of definition. Therefore there
is this "incentive" to increase costs in CPIF contracts whenever the cost exceeds the fee swings in either direc-
tion. Between the fee swings, however, the CPIF contract has the variable second term (the variable fee term) as
a basis for offsetting this gain. This fee function will obviously vary with the various cost parameters - the shar-
ing arrangements and the fee swings, as well as the cost outcome. The. peculiarities of this fee function will be
examined in the follow ing examples.
For purposes of illustration, the following combinations of cost situations are examined; (a) the CPIF direct
target costs equal to the direct costs on the fixed price sales, _o) the CPIF direct target costs equal to .1 of the
fixed price costs, (c) overhead or burden factors of 2:1 and 1:1, plus (d) various selected values of sha._ing arrange-
ments and fee swings. The numerous parameters complicate the analysis and the following examination will
attempt to generalize from these selected situations.
Conside.- first a fee arrangement with unlimited fee swings. The inclusion of fee swings results in a piece-
wise function which complicates hut does not greatly modify the subsequent evaluation. Since there is cousiderable
insistence in the contracting manur Is that the fee swings be made as large as possible, this will provide commen-
tary on the situation in which this objective is attained. With this assumption we need only to consider equation
(Ta).(Examples are considered later in which the complete fee expression is used). The first derivative of equation
(7a) is
dF*= -k + (S)c1 (1 - k) (c 2 + A c2)
dx (cI + x)2
The secondderivativeis
d2F__=:* -2cI(1-k)(c2 + A c_) (9)
dx2 = (cI + x)3
For allposRivevaluesofx, the_eewillbe maximizedwhere thefirstorderconditioniszero.
Setting(8)equaltozeroand solvingfork determinesthesharingfractionwhich willmaximizethe feefunction
ata givencostoutcome,x.
ko = , c2 + A c2
x2 (10)
Cl + c2 + Ac2 +_1 + 2x
F*(x) is concave add there is a value of k, k = k_, which will maximize F*(x) at x = xo. As k varies from k = 1.0
to k = 0, F*(x) rotates counter-clockwise about xo and changes shape; also, F*'(Xo; k) _ 0 for k<k_ and
F*'(Xo; k)<0 for k > k_. The effects of changes in k can be noted in Figures 10 to 15. As noted, with the addition
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of the fee swings F*(x) becomes a piece-wise function; orce the fee swing is exceeded, the net return is always
increased by increasir, g the variable cost. Given k< k_, the fee can be maximized by overruns, and for k> k_, by
underruns. This is in contrast to the fee function, F(x), in which the maximum fee for a given k is always attained
at the lowest cost. Ilowever, given that an overrun occurred, the maximum fee occurs when k = 0 and vice versa;
i.e.. for fee maximization the contractor would select a sharing fraction of either one or zero.
Function (10) is plotted in Figure 9 for various selected cost parameters. Figure 9a pertains to a cost situa-
tion in which the negotiated CPIF contract adds variable cost equal to those of the firm-fixed price sales. Figure
9b pertains to a cost situation in which the CPIF contracts increase the firm's vaL'iable expense by 10%. Various
levels of additional overhead (A c2) were assumed as pertaining to the CPIF contract; but under the as,_umptions,
these values do not vary with variations in the variable cost.
Referring to Figure 9a: ]f the CPIF contract is accepted with an increase in the o',erhead of A c2 = 100 = xo
and c2/c 1 = 2, a sharing factor of 43% would maximize the fee function for a valiable c_t outcome equal to the
target cost (function a). If the CPIF contract was accepted with the _a;.'..e addition to overhead (A c2 = 100) and
Cl/C 2 = 1, then a sharing factor of .33 would maximize the fee functt_,,l at the target cost (function b). An initial
overhead to variable cost of 2:1 combined with no additional fred ,- _ a_sociated with the CPIF contract
(Ac 2 = 0) is also illustrated by function (b). Finally, a CPIF corn,, ct witl_. 2/Cl = 1 and no incremental overhead
would find the function [ko(X )] illustrated by function c. The same parameter _,._ _'ons are illustrated in Fig-
ure 9b, except that the absolute levels of c2 and c I are increased by an order of _a_nitude.
Some judgments might be made by comparing the information from these figures with the sharing arrangements
being negotiated or likely to be negotiated under pros.ant contracting conditions. If the CPIF contract involves
costs on the order of 10% of the firm's fixed price costs, it would appear that the range ¢'f sharinF ¢.ractions which
would maximize the fee/unction at underruns considerably exceed most all of the sharing arrangements now being
negotiated; a contractor with a sharing arrangement less than .40 and cost parameters g,ven in Figure 9b would
maximize fee at practically unlimited overruns. For the parameter descriptions of Figure 9a only a contractor with
a cost situation given by c would find the present average level of sharing arrangements maximizing the fee at
underruns.
It is important to examine this fee function in its entirety, i.e., including the fee swings. Figure 10 through
15 illustrate fee functions 7a, 7b, and 7c (solid lines) for selected parameters. The dotted line illustrates function
7a when x 1 = 0 and x2 = _. All figures assume the target percentage (y) is equal to .08. Except for Figure 13,
each figure is given with two cost ratios, c2/c I = 2 and c2/c I = 1. Because of the number of parameters involved
in the function, we have "bracketed" the more probable cost situations by assuming certain reasonable limits to
those parameter values. For example, data from the files of NASA indicate that the burden ratio seldom is less
! than I:I or more than 2:1. On the other hand, we have no information as to the distribution of the ratio of variable
_ costs on accepted CPIF contracts to the variable costs of fixed price contracts - nor is it obvious how such infor-
mation would be interpreted if available. However, the assumptions of tw ontract situations, one doubling the
firm's variable costs and one increasing it I0%, might be reasonable boundary values for this parameter.
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, At first glance the size of the "fee n may be_somewhat startling; this, of course, is explained by the third term
of equation 7a. Lower values of the ra' ;o c2/c 1 serve to reduce the overall levzl of this function, F*(x); but in the
caSes illustrated, the net gain on the contract will be comparatively lsrge in terms of the fee arrangement, i.e., the
fee is comparatively unimportant. The fee swings convert the fee function from a CPIF contract to a CPFF contract
forvalues of the cos_ outcome exceeding those corresponding to the upper and lower fee swings. So long as an in-
crease in the direct cost on the contract is not accompanied by a _roportional increase in the overhead cost, and
unless all sales are cost-plus there is always a net gain from increasing the qosts on a CPFF contract. It is ap-
parent that the existence of a fee swing would give the contractor faced with an overrun condition an option of
increasing his fee either by increasing the overrunor by cutting costs.
Figures 10 and 11 also demosstrate that selection k -'-k_ would produce a comparatively "flat n fee fur.,:tion
and a probable i_llfference (on the contmctol"s part) as to the cost outcomes between the fee swings. This is
more noticeable when the cost-plus contracts form a smaller percentage of the fire's tgtal saleG. (See Figures 14
and 15). The sharing arrangements must be quite high compared with those negotiated today for the fee function to
have an important increase associated with a decrease in cost between the defined limits of the fec swing. (See
Figure 12). Once the fee swings are exceeded in either direction, hcwevar, the fee is more sensitive to the cost
outcome, except forextreme values of k. On the premise that a given overrun is easier to attain than an underrun,
it is msoashle to anticipate that if tb_-contractor elects to increase his fee by control of the cost outcome (v/hich
he is in a pus_tion to do later in the contract) he will most likely do so by overruns.
Changing the btmien from a ratio of 2:1 to 1:1 changes the overall level of the fee, but it does not materially
affect the shape of the curves and the previous observations. On the other hand reducing the burden ratio decreases
the values of ko for any given value of cost outcome x. This is especially noticeable when the initial burden is
large compared to that for the CPIF contract. Also increasing c2 will serve to increase the overall level d the fee
function° ceteris paribus.
Contractor Deoinion l/sk/nE with lee(z)
A contractor aware of his marginal costs could IosicaUy co,_sider the fee funct/on F*(x) in place of the tradi-
tional function, F(x), fordecision making under uncertainty. Furdamentally the contractor should consider the
transformaUonof this fee function into his utility function in the mannerdiscussed earlier. It does not seem par-
tlcularly useful to assume an'_tber utility function as a basis for additional examples; rather, it would seem surf/-
cient to examine the fee fur,c' ._ under certain parameter assumptions recognizing the importance of the utility
transformation (or subjectively wei_i:t/ng the probable loss versus the probable gain).
Maximization of the function E[F*(x, k)] = _ F*(x, k)h (x)dx would occur where dE[F* (x, k)]/dk = 0 23 Since
23 The optimumchoice of k with the function E[F*(x, k)] will change at a value of xo >p, as in contrast with the
function ElF(x)], where the optimum choice changes at xo = p.
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k .s independent cf x, the function under the integral can be differentiated. The derivative is a linear function of
k, so the function will either maximize for k = 0 or k = 1.0. As before, the contractor will base his decisions on the
utility function of fees, which is again assumed to be concave. To review, a utility function based upon the function
F(x) will rotate to a value of U(x)=consta_t as k approaches zero. Since the fee function F*tx) is concave and pivots
about xo as k changes, the utility function will do likewise; utility as a function of F*(x) will swing f:om a strictly
concave function of x monotonically increasing (when k -- 0) to a strictly concave monotonic_,lly decreasing func-
tion of x when k = 1. And, as before, the maximum utility can occur with partial sharing fractions. A contractor
negotiating a contract on the basis of F*(x) might, therefore, be expected to have som_- indifference to xo so long
as he is in a reasonable position to negotiat_ the sharing fractirm since, as noted, the .fee function is comparatively
flat for values of k approximately equal to _hose maximizing the fee at xo. It is possibl._, that contracts negotiated
upon the function F*(x) would have a tendency to stabilize about the expected cost. Certainly, if the k were r,e-
gotiated at the value ko there would be every incentive for the contractor to attain his target cost since the utility
is maximized at that cost value. However, under the cost parameters assumed in our examples, ko+ considerably
exceeds the values of sharing fractions now being negotiated.
The previous comments were confined to F*(x) as defined by 7a where x 1 = 0 and x2 = 0_. The opposite
extreme would he a function with narrow fee swings. Narrow fee swings tend to produce a function which, except
for a narrow range is essentially an increasing function of x. The,efore, narrow fee s,,,ings would tend to make it
of less interest to the contractor to negotiate high target costs and high sharing fractions. Since the values of
x 1 and x2 define F*(x), one cannot determine an optimum combination of fee swings, sharing fractions and target
costs. Each of these parameters are st_bject to separate negotiations and it is difficult to generalize os to how
the contractor should negotiate in this instant. However, the contractor in most situations should find wide fee
swings acceptable to the government negotiators. One "optimizing" procedure might be to negotiate in terms of
unlimited fee swings and attempt to improve the contracting position with the fee swings last, ks suggested by the
other terms negotiated.
The advantage of using the function F*(x) in the decision process is the unequivocal advantage of a more pre-
cise statement of the fee outcome, unless the proportion of cost-plus to total sales is high. 24 If, as in some cases,
the other cost-plus contracts are sufficiently near :ompletion thet the costs can be fairly determinsd, the expected
net fee and the selection of an optimum k can be calculated with slight modifications of F*(x) and a moderate in-
crease in computational complexity. If, on the other hand, the firm's other sales involve several incentive con-
tracts with unknown costs, then the selection of an optimum sharing fraction becomes the evaluation ot a joint den-
sity and a fee function involving multiple cost outcomes. However. in this case there would be a specific k for the
contract which would maximize the expected net utility on all contracts.
24Access to a limited amount of proprietary data indicates that of the top 100 defense contrac, tors tn 1962-63, 48%
of them had better than 50% of their sales in firm-fixed price category. Thesq firms would certainly be more than
casually concerned about the effects of marginal pricing of their CPlF contracts. On the other hand, it must be
noted that the large companies among this group had less than 50% FFP sales, and these are the firms which
have a larger percentage of government contracts.
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The prev._.ous comments have been based upon the assumotion of a symmetrical cost density function. A dis-
tribution highly skewed to the righ_ would, in effect, serve to restrict the rar.b._ of pr,ssible undo _s, especially
if the target cost is in the vicinity of the modal, rather that. the expected cost outcome. A contractor who bases
his negotiation decisions on the expected cost outcome would undoubtedly attempt to compensate for the skewed
distribution by the negotiation of either a low upper limit to the fee swing or a value of k lower than that maximiz-
ing (Ta) at the target cost. Other conditions may be assumed, but it does not appear that important increases in
our understanding of the problem w_ld be obtained from an examination of skewed distributions.
Marginal Fee Function with V_riable Overhead Assumptions, F** (x)
As stated earlier it is desirable to examine this model under the assumption that Ac 2 is considered to vary
proportionally with changes in x. This is equivalent to an assumptioa that all overhead is variable overhead, and
is hut one of the infinity of overhead situations which could be assumed. This assumption should offer a "reason-
able other hound _ to our model.
In this case the fee function (following equations 7a, 7b, 7c) is
x 2+_] xAc 2
x 2 +'-_"=J + -_ (11a)
F**=FXo(l+flo) +k o(l+flo)'X" cl+x c l+x xo .
for xI <_.x _<x2
Ix / xIA hl
Xl_C2,-+-x_-_J-[+ x 2+-'f_° ) xAc2 (llb)
=yx o(l+rio)*k o(l+rio)'Xl" c l+x I J c 1*x x o
for 0 _ x < x 1
x2 + _.Xo/_+ x 2 +''iS'o/ xAc2- - _ (11c)
=),x o(l+rio) +k o(l+rio)'X2 c l+x 2 J c l'+x xo
for x2<x< _o
Again a,,,suming an unlimited fee. swing [equation 11a where 0< x< oo]
(c 2ClAC2X Ac2x2)dF** (1 - k) lC2 4 x9 +----f_Q Ac 2
= -k + -_(CI + X)2 Xo
Setting the first derivative equal to zero and solving for k
c2 xo
kfCl (l+AC2_ x2 +2 + x+c I +c 2Xo /
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Figure 16 is comparable to Figure 9, although it will be noted that the cu_es are "lower" on the scale. Under
these assumptions the values ot' k which will maximize the fee with underruns are lower than under the assumption
of non-varying overhead. For those situations in which the proportion of incremental overhead to variable cost is
the same on the contract as for the original burdez_ in the firm (that burden existing prior to contract negotiatior0
the fee function will be identical to F(x). Therefore coz_tract situations with cost paramete._ meeting these condi-
tions ate not shown on these figures. But unless the ratios of overhead to variable cost n,eet these conditions,
or, to put it conversely, if Ac2/x o < c2/c 1 , there is additional fee a:_sociatad with the overhead payments.
Figure 17 should be examined in comparison to Figure 13. Both conv, Lder the same cost parameters and shar-
ing arrangements. The assumption of completely variable overhead changes the slope of the fee function (or the
value of the cost outcome at which the fee function is optimized). However there remains more than one cost out-
come at which the fee function will be optimized and the previous comments concerning the contractor 'r options
hold fez this case. Figure 18 illustrates a situation in which Ac2/x I -" c2/c 1. One will note the similarity be-
tv,_en this fee function and those considered in previous sections of this paper. Also, as the proportion of cost-
plus sales to total sales increases, F**(x) approaches F(x), the usual fee expression.
Note on FPI Contracts
The previous discussion has been confiaed largely to the CPIF contract form. The FPI contract has an upper
price (cost) limit beyond which it converts to a fixed price contract. This difference in the two contract forms
does not significantly change the previous observations about optimal behavior of contractors. The contractor
would obviously be more concerned about the effect of cost uncertainty with a FPI contract than with a CPIF con-
tract and would be induced to negotiate target costs higher than the expected costs (x o would be negotiated much
higher than V re_tive to the variance of the subjective cost density) and low shariag fractions for a given target
fee. If the contractor establishes his behavior on marginal cost outcome, the opportunity for reward from exceed-
i_ the target cost is limited, but there would still be situations in which the fee is maximized by overruns.
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Appendix *
Given:
b
U(xo - x) f(x) dx = 0
a
g(o) = o
u" (xo - x) <o
Show that
_U[k(x o- x)] f(x) dy _0 for O<k<!.O
a
Proof: Since U" (x) < O, U(x) is a strictly concave function.
For e strictly concave function we have the following relationship**
U(qlx I + q2x2) > qlU(Xl ) + q2U(x2 ) for xI _ x2
where
ql +q2=l
ql>_0
q2>0
Letting
0< k< 1.0
ql = k,xI = xo-x
q2 = 1-k,x2 = 0
and recallin_ that U(0) = 0
U[k(xo-x)]> kU(xo-x)
Then
_IU[k(xo -x)]-kU(xo -x)lf(_)dx> 0
a
b b
•'. !U[k(xo-x)]f(x)dx-kf[U(xo-x)]f(x)dx>0
a a
!
* Thi' proof was provided by Professor H.W. LiIliefors, the George Washingt'm University.
** See Hardy, Littlewood, Polya, lneqtwlities, Cambridge University Press, 1934; pp. 73-77.
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Since the second term in the above expression was given as equal to zero
b
.', H(k) = fU[k(x o - x)] f(x) dx > 0 for O<k<l.0
a
if H(0) = H(1.0) = 0
and H(k) is strictly concave
then H(k) attains a maximum for 0< k< 1.0
Proof:
b -x)2 U " -
= _(xo [k(xo x)]f(x)dx<O
a
since
(xo - x)2 > 0
f(x) > 0
an_U" [k(xo - x)] < 0
1966014828-058
[1] Adams, Ernest W., "Surve) oi Bernoullian Utility Theory", Matheraaticat Thinking in :he Measurement of
Behavior, Herbert Solomon, ed., Free Press _,f Gle_coe, 1960.
[2] Aichian, A.A., "the Meaning of Utility Measurement', American Economic R(;view, March 1953, pp 26-50.
[3] _, "Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production", Econometrics, October I963, pp. 679-(:9?.
[4] Anthony, Robert N., "The Trou01e with Profit Maximization", Harvard Business Re:'iew, Nov.-Dee. 1960,
pp. 126-134.
[5] Baldwin, William L., "The Motives of Manager.%Environmental Restraints and the T;,_o:y of Mana_-e:iel
Enterprise', Quarterly Journal of Lconomics, May 1964, pp. 238-256
[6] Baumol, William J., _nsiness Behavior, Value and Growth, M:Millan Company, New Ymx, 1961.
[7] --, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1961.
[8] --, _On the Theory ot' Expansion of the Firm", American Econondc Re:view, December 1962, p_,107g-1087.
{9} Chamb,_-rlin, Edwad H., "Full Cost and Monopolistic Competition", Economic ]ourr_P. June 19S2, pp. 318-325.
[10] Cyert, R.M., and March, J.G., "OrganizatJansl Factors in the Theory of Oligopoly", Quarterly ]ournal o[
Economics, Febr',ary 1956, pp. 44-64.
[11] Department of Defense, Incentive Contrac:ing Guide, 19&3.
[12] Edwards, Nard, "The Theory of Decision Making_, PsycP,otoeIical Bulletin, July, 1954; pp. 380-417.
[13] Ensberg, D., "Classical and Current Notions on Measurable Utility", Economic _,_m_'_al,September 1954,
pp. 528-556.
[14] Gordon, R.A., Bus:hess Leadership in the Large Co_IvG'adon, Brookings Institution, Washington, b.C., 1945.
[IS] Kyburg, H.E., and Smokier, Howard E., Studies in Subjective Probability, ._okn Wiley, New York, 1963.
[16] Luce, R. Duncan, and Raiffa, Howard, Game_ _d Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957.
[17] Mards, Robin, The Economic Theory of Managerial ":.apitalism, Free Pres,_ of Glance, e, 1964.
[18] Marshall, A.W., and Meckling, W.H., "Predictability of Costs and Ti._m ar.d Success of Development", National
Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report, Rate and 13irection o[ Inventive A,'tiv:ty, PrinceLon,
1962.
[19] Moore, Fred T., Military Procurement sac Contracting: An Economic Analysis, RAND Co_pozationMemo,
Rltb294,S-PR, 1962.
[20] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA In,-enti_,c Contracting Guide, January 196._.
[21] National Security Industrial Association, Addresses Delivered at the Syerqx_ium on the Profit l_otive and
Co,st Reduction, Washington, D.C., 15-16 June 1961.
[22] Scherer, Fred M., "The "[heoW of Contractural Incentives for Cost Red,action", Quarterly ]oumal of Economics,
May 1964, pp. 257-280.
[23] _, The Weapons Acquisition Process, Economic Incentives, Harvard Graduate Schc_! of Brsiness Adn,in-
istration, Bos:on, 1964.
[24] Schlaiffe,, Robert, Introduction to Statistics for Business Decisions, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961.
[25] Stigler, G.J., The Theory of Price, McMilla_ =ompany, New York, 1952.
[26] United States Congress, Pern_anent Subcommittee on Investigations, Pyramiding of Profits ar,d Costs in t_e
Missile Procurement Program, 88th Congress 2d Session, Senate Re_ort no. 970, March 31, 1964.
I 'fP',4all_lllft m _ I I I I L:_ ' --
'
1966014828-059
